Islamists vs. Islamists: a positive for Egypt? (Part 2)

By Ali Ezzatyar

(For Part I, from a few days ago, see here.)

The idea that the Muslim Brotherhood's ascent to power spelled the beginning of a dangerous era underestimated the complexities of the Egyptian landcape and overlooked a number of important nuances.

It is now clear that the Egyptian military establishment had no intention of letting the Brotherhood, or any party but its own, govern freely. While Mohamed Morsi is proving himself to be a competent tactician in the tug and war that has followed his election, his influence is still very limited. He and his party, backed by most Egyptians, are essentially locked in a power struggle with the military. The result of that struggle remains anyone's guess and will take many more months, if not years, to have any notion of permanence.

Further, insofar as Morsi is able to form and implement domestic and foreign policy, the circumstances under which he is forced to formulate such policy is necessarily bringing him away from the extreme elements in his own party. That should be an essential consideration for the international community, and particularly the West, in developing its own policies towards the new Egypt.

The Egyptian military, led symbolically by its president, is currently embarking on an operation that is being called the most significant military exercise by its armed forces in 30 years. That operation, which targets Islamic militants, genuinely flies in the face of the conventional wisdom the world applied to Egypt when its revolution began. At the helm of power, the Brotherhood presidency has at least temporarily abandoned a number of its core pan-Islamic ideals. While this is likely seen by the new president as necessary to maintain stability in the short term, it also serves as a boon for none other than Israel, a purported arch-nemesis, and stability in the region.

This demonstrates two key things. First, power is begetting moderation, and second, Islamists, as with other long-time opposition parties that ascend to power, are rational when their hard-fought and won positions are at stake.

Naturally, since suspicion about the Muslim Brotherhood has not subsided, the media's spin on the events of the last two weeks has painted the military operation as Morsi's way of outmaneuvering the military. But that neglects the reality that the military still wields the power in Egypt -- any maneuvering Morsi is involved in, including dismissing members of the military itself, is likely with the military's support. It is unclear what this all means for the Brotherhood's longevity or its domestic policy going forward, but the current balance of power between the democratically elected party and the military suits the international community, and that community can take a few key steps to help maintain that balance:

First, it can provide the Egyptian military what it needs, in terms of material and moral support, to maintain domestic order. Besides the obvious practical necessities of stability, this will push the image that the government still has the ability to maintain order. Israel has set an example by allowing unprecedented access to movement within the Sinai. What this serves to do is build national confidence in the functioning of the Egyptian bureaucracy, which trickles down to the presidency only if the president publicly supports such activity. Given the precariousness of Morsi's position, he is obliged to give that support. If he later backtracks on the anti-militant stance he has taken, he may ultimately undermine his own legitimacy.

Second, the international community should continue to call on the Egyptian military to allow for the democratic process in Egypt to play itself out. Unlike its decision to ostracize Hamas in the aftermath of its election in the Palestinian territories to no benefit of Israel or the Palestinians, it has so far maintained a pro-democracy stance in Egypt. This is the only rational public face that the West can assume without losing the favor of the Egyptian people, but it is also a win-win situation tactically speaking. It can help further moderate Egypt's new government as it seeks to evolve and grow in stature. And since the military has demonstrated that international pressure to reform must have its limits, it is also relatively risk-free. The West can rest assured that the military will not be handing power to an Islamist government in short order. Meanwhile, the dichotomy between Egypt's two main domestic forces may serve to moderate both, which has the best chance for long-term stability and reform towards a healthy democracy.

Talk of a healthy democracy is still premature, to be sure. But with Morsi and other prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt recently calling for regime change in Syria, it would appear that some sort of order is emerging from the Egyptian chaos that can even serve as an example for Egypt's neighbors.

Islamists vs. Islamists: a positive for Egypt?

By Ali Ezzatyar

When purported Islamists in the Sinai brazenly massacred Egyptian border guards and broke through the Israeli border, it was difficult to interpret the event as anything but catastrophic. The attacks seemed to add some substance to fears of a new Islamist Egypt, the primary trepidation of many since the beginning of the uprisings in Tahrir square. Perhaps, though, this all presents an opportunity. The world only need to look at its most recent mistakes.

In the debate surrounding Islam, Islamism, and government, there is a critical question that remains to be answered. Does power moderate? There is little reliable data on the subject, since movements advocating for Islamic governments rarely win power; when they do, they are usually sabotaged.

In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) came to power in the early '90s through free and fair elections. This represented the only hiatus from government control for the revolutionary FLN, which lead Algeria since its independence (and continues to do so today). The FIS openly called into question the democratic process that brought them to power, asserting instead that the rule of God was superior to the rule of man. Citing the threat to the democratic process that the FIS posed, the Algerian military annulled the electoral process after only two months, driving the FIS underground and Algeria into a bloody civil war that decimated the country.

At the time, many advocated for the FLN and the military to respect the results of a fair electoral process. The argument was made that, if the FIS lead government failed to do things like pick up the trash regularly, ordinary Algerians would regret their choice and ultimately pressure them to change. The experiment never had the opportunity to play itself out.

The more recent and very relevant example is on Egypt and Israel's own doorstep. The Palestinian territories had their first region wide democratic elections in 2006 that pitted Hamas, the Islamist party, against Fatah, Palestine's equivalent of China's Communist Party. Hamas, who still has not recognized the legitimacy of the state of Israel, won a majority. The international community did not know how to react. While they had advocated for democracy and reform in the Palestinian territories, they had trouble reconciling that with the result of the popular vote. As a result, most security council countries acquiesced to Israel's response of effectively annulling the results of that election and sidelining Hamas from any genuine government of the territories.

This was an unfortunate outcome. In that case, there was immediate evidence of Hamas' recognition that they needed to abandon their anti-Israel idealism since they had been transformed from a revolutionary, anti-government movement, to the majority in parliament. Behind the scenes negotiations and meetings revealed that Hamas would even negotiate directly with Israel. Israel and the United States, however, declared Hamas' vocal non-recognition of Israel as a non-starter. Hamas was ejected from the driver's seat rather arbitrarily. Like with the FIS in Algeria, in Palestine, no quantifiable evolution in the political conflict, or the democratic process, has resulted since. Circumvention of the democratic process at the expense of Islamists does not seem to be working.

The Muslim Brotherhood's election in Egypt incited predictions of horror, likening Egypt's future to that of Iran's. As with our other examples, these fears have allowed traditional parties to exercise their influence and maintain their authoritarianism with impunity. Take the dismissal of Egypt's democratically elected, Islamist parliament.

Enter the conflict in the Sinai. The new Islamist presidency in Egypt, contrary to what anyone could have guessed, is locked in a battle with none other than Islamists in the Sinai. Mohamed Morsi has been forced to crack down on the alleged Islamic militants with force, both rhetorically, and militarily (to the extent his limited power allows). The primary reason for this is the obvious necessity to maintain control within Egypt’s borders and prevent a broader conflict with Israel.

But there are other factors at play that are important to note. Firstly, the president of a party whose members vowed to sever ties with Israel as an election platform is now seemingly cooperating closely with Israel. The Israelis are allowing Egypt to perform military sorties in the Sinai for the first time since 1973, despite a peace treaty explicitly outlawing such activities. Israeli politicians have characterized Egypt’s behavior as "positive." Out of catastrophe has grown unexpected collusion of the highest order.

Ultimately, anti government Islamic militancy has forced the new persident's hand in a way nobody, perhaps even Morsi himself, would have imagined. Given the suspicion surrounding his presidency, and the flagrant nature of the attacks in the Sinai and Israel, he had little choice. In essence, power for the Muslim Brotherhood has obliged them to act as any government would have in a similar scenario: crack down on militants that undermine your legitimacy and authority. With the unexpected killing of Egyptian border guards by these militants, an inevitability has surfaced of the sort that the FIS and Hamas never had the opportunity to witness: Power seems to be moderating. But it is more complicated than the events of one week. Sustaining this transition takes effort from everyone.

(Part 2 later in the week.)

Pakistan faces the abyss

Guest post by Hamid M. Khan

Hamid M. Khan is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Colorado Law School and a Fellow with the Truman National Security Project.

Leaders from Afghanistan and Pakistan met in Washington last week, stoking hopes that greater cooperation between the two nations would facilitate a united front against the increasingly powerful Taliban. Afghanistan's weakness in this partnership is long-standing, but it is Pakistan's new instability that is catching the world's attention. Once a stable nuclear state, Pakistan's future is now far from predictable. How it will respond in the months ahead remains to be seen, but one thing that is clear is that Pakistan cannot face this constellation of existential challenges without the United States.

Pakistan's current fever-pitch battle with the Taliban cannot be resolved by armed force alone. Instead, the present conflict finds its causes in the vacuum of an episodic democracy; a state ravaged by military rule, the cancer of corruption, and the nation's inability to deal with its Islamic origins.

Founded as a democratic state and predicated on the British system of rule, Pakistan has suffered from intermittent episodes of democracy in which civilian governments were often inept and military rule was unwilling to cede power. More troubling, however, is that the current civilian government appears so helpless that it almost reflexively seeks a negotiated end to violence, but without securing any compromises from the extremists.

Equally troubling is that the military which created and trained many of the extremists it is now fighting has seen its morale erode, even while it maintains control over Pakistan's sizeable nuclear arsenal. Should military morale erode even further, one wonders if the military will follow the path of the ISI (Pakistan's intelligence service) and undermine U.S. efforts in the region, especially by relaxing control over portions of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

Pakistan's failures at governance have begotten one of the most corrupt nations in the world. In fact, Pakistanis have become so accustomed to the self-serving interests of bureaucrats on every level – military or civilian, religious or secular – that they are simply unwilling to invest in their social and governmental institutions. The abysmal of failure of Pakistan's social institutions have left this much of its enormous population without electricity or drinking water, let alone education or health care.

Pakistanis have become increasingly restless for institutions which may act as a check on entrenched power. When the former president, General Pervez Musharraf sacked the chief justice of the Pakistani Supreme Court in 2007, Pakistanis took to the streets and helped to bring down his government. When Pakistan's current leadership failed to reinstate this same chief justice, popular protest nearly toppled the government once again.

Finally, there stands Pakistan's inability to deal with its Islamic roots. To begin, Pakistan was founded on the strident belief that a Hindu-dominated India could not adequately represent the rights of Muslims who lived within the subcontinent. Consequently, West and East Pakistan were created in 1947. Pakistan was unique because the nation itself was predicated on the religious -- rather than on the cultural or lingual -- character of its citizenry.

Less than two decades later, however, Pakistan could not preserve its national integrity and civil war led East Pakistan to become Bangladesh in 1971. Today, after sliding between secularism and religiosity, Pakistan ostensibly finds itself in another civil war. Will Pakistan's Islamic identity tip more towards democracy and moderate Islamism, or will it descend into extremist ideology? This is the question that sits at the center of the battle for the soul of Pakistan.

The problem is the allure the extremists offer. They promise honest and robust institutions to a population that deals with rampant corruption everyday. That is why the fight in Pakistan cannot be won through arms alone. The U.S. must partner with the Pakistani military to root out extremists. We cannot allow Pakistan and its nuclear weapons to come under the control of a theology that relegates women to servitude, forestalls education, decimates tolerance, and encourages violence.

Yet there is a limit to how long Pakistanis will tolerate civilian casualties and refugee camps for the sake of a corrupt government. If you build a sand castle on the water line, it doesn't matter how well it's built: high tide will sweep it away. We can partner with the Pakistani military to sweep away insurgents, but unless we help Pakistan build credible institutions, extremists will rush right back in. Until we make that happen, the abyss Pakistan is perched upon will only grow deeper.

Around the World: China, Zimbabwe, Somalia, the Ukraine, and the Vatican

By Michael J.W. Stickings

The latest in our ongoing series... (for previous entries, see here or here).

1) China: "China's exports have dropped into their biggest decline in a decade. Exports in December were down 2.8% from the same time last year, a bigger decline than November's 2.2% drop, the China Daily said."

Even though "China's economy relies on domestic demand for its goods and services more than any other country in Asia," which is to say, even though the decline in exports is perhaps less of a concern to China than it would be for others, what the numbers show is that "China is no more immune to worldwide trade problems than any other large economy." And it is likely to get worse: "With Japan, the US and Europe now in recession, China's heavily trade-dependent economy is expected to harder hit through the coming year."

Still, a growth rate of 7.5% in 2009 wouldn't be so bad, would it?

2) Zimbabwe: "Zimbabwe's cholera epidemic has killed more than 2,000 people and almost 40,000 have contracted the normally preventable disease, the World Health Organisation said on Tuesday."

As if it weren't already bad enough in that wretched place, what with the tyrant Mugabe clinging to power and continuing to oppress the people, now there's this, which "has spread to all of Zimbabwe's 10 provinces because of the collapse of health and sanitation systems." And the situation will only get worse during the January-March rainy season.

3) Somalia: "Ethiopian troops pulled out from crucial bases in Mogadishu on Tuesday, leaving a power vacuum that was quickly filled by Islamist fighters who seized their positions."

And so, with the Ethiopians soon to be out, within a matter of days, Somalia is left to the Somalis... and to "Somalia’s Islamist movement," which "has made a steady comeback, with Islamist factions again controlling much of the country.

One war is over, but another is already underway: "Many Western diplomats and other Somalia analysts have warned that once all the Ethiopians are gone, the various Islamist factions will unleash their considerable firepower on each other in a scramble to take over the country. Some of that fighting has already kicked off, with dozens of people killed in the past week in combat between moderate and radical Islamist factions."

4) Ukraine: "Just hours after Russia resumed delivery of natural gas to the European Union through Ukrainian pipelines, Kiev has admitted to blocking the supplies. Ukraine is claiming that Gazprom has established 'unacceptable' conditions for the transit of the gas to Europe."

It's a complicated situation, obviously, with Gazprom blaming the U.S. for backing the Ukraine (and accusing the Ukraine of stealing gas), but it is essentially a regional dispute between Moscow and Kiev "over gas pricing and the lucrative transit fees paid to Kiev for gas transported across its pipelines." (Though Anne Applebaum notes that it was actually Putin, who still runs the show in Russia, who actually turned off the gas, not Gazprom. So it's political, not just commercial, and, this year, Russia is very much to blame.)

Russian gas is essential to much of Europe, but what is needed is for Europe to disentangle itself from the situation by reducing its dependency on Russian gas in the first place. And that requires, in Applebaum's view (one I share, though I defer to her expertise here), "a true, unified E.U. energy policy," even if, as Clay Risen points out, there are no "easy or obvious answers" and, to put it mildly, "difficulties inherent in any such effort."

5) Vatican: "Decrying the violence that Mexicans are enduring, the Vatican has suggested excommunication as a possible punishment for drug traffickers whose war with the government has led to the deaths of thousands of people in the last year. But the Roman Catholic Church's severest form of rebuke would probably have little effect on traffickers and killers who lack a religious conscience, the Vatican's No. 2 official, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, acknowledged."

You think?

On the nature of terrorism

By Carol Gee

The subject of GWOT is a perfect study in "The Blind Men and the Elephant." It depends who describes it blindfolded. First of all "GWOT" sounds like someone attempting to clear his throat. And it is a misnomer in several ways:

Global -- there may be a number of terrorist cells and a larger number of virtual jihad groups, but that does not mean they are everywhere around the globe. It would be like the blind man trying to describe the elephant as a wall, or trying to figure out how big the elephant is by trying to embrace the animal. "Global" is to big to get your arms around.
War -- a nation cannot fight a true "war" against the tactic of terrorist acts. It would be like the blind man holding on to the tail trying to describe the elephant as similar to a rope. A coiled rope looks as if it has no beginning or end; it goes on forever.
On -- meaning against, pertaining to, or about is not an accurate description of the various wars we are currently waging. It would be like the blind man holding on to the elephant's leg, describing it as like the trunk of a tree. This war ON terror is like saying the tree trunk is on its branches. It does not work that way.
Terror -- The term terrorism is carrying out an act of violence, against an individual or group, in order to terrorize, to immobilize the victims(s). It would be like the blind man holding the elephant's trunk and describing an elephant as like a snake. Because an elephant acts to coil its trunk does not mean that a trunk is a venomous thing.

Simply put the United States went to war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and it went to war against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Troops and guns and bombs relate to war. It may feel like war but it need not be described that way, just because we happen to be in two wars at the moment. Neither airline security gates, border crossing kiosks, Coast Guard patrol boats, warrantless wiretapping, data mining, nor the consolidation of 16 agencies into one HSA, relate to war. These are defensive or protective tactics, not even rising to the level of a strategy. We do not have a coherent strategy to fight the acts of radical jihadis. We are still too blind to see what what this big thing looks like.

Briefly, Terrorism, is more understandable than one would think, given the propaganda surrounding the term. The Washington Note's Steve Clemons spotlights a moderate Republican businessman's thought provoking essay on Terrorism:

Richard Vague, a businessman who became distressed by the course the U.S. was on and its misapplication of power and resources in the inaptly named war on terror, wrote a set of New America Foundation essays titled, "Terrorism: A Brief for Americans."

This brief was designed for those casually interested in the affairs of Washington -- businessmen, primarily -- who have other things going on in their lives and don't realize how the US economy and America's own moral credibility were being quickly undermined by the war in Iraq and our collectively bad national security decisions.

New America Foundation: A Report from American Respect
Terrorism: A Brief for Americans
The Scope, Causes, and Means for Reducing Terrorism, Including Commentary on Iraq
Richard W. Vague
American Respect | February 2007

There is a very interesting discussion of Osama bin Laden and others going on at Project Lucidity, "Bin Laden's Al Qaeda vs. Sunni Insurgency in Iraq," in which I have been a participant. Many of the comments are about describing of what we are talking, what is the reality of the threat, and how do so-called terrorists think. What drives them -- and us -- in this conflict. Some very smart people are teaching me some things I did not know until recently. The thread is worth the read.

(Cross-posted at South by Southwest.)

Sageman on Leaderless Jihad -- 4

By Carol Gee

"The Evolution of Global Islamist Terror"

Today's post is the fourth in a series laying out the most important new ideas and ways of thinking I learned from Marc Sageman -- (see "32 page power-point," pdf link *below). In previous posts I gave an overview of Dr. Sageman's exploration of the dynamics of radicalization, of how people eventually get on the path to political violence. He maintains that these are young men chasing thrills, fantasies of glory and the sense of belonging to an important group and cause. It is a bottom-up process involving four major factors: 1) There is a sense of moral outrage. 2) There is a specific interpretation of the meaning of the precipitating event or events. 3) It resonates with their own personal experience. 4) The mobilization takes place through networks.

Three waves of radicalism, according to Sageman, marked the evolution of the violent jihadi movements. ( See pp 31-32 of Sageman's PowerPoint* below). The first, 1980-1988, was begun in Pakistan and Afghanistan by Osama bin Laden and his companions, the "African Arabs." They were well educated, predominately Egyptian, around age 30 at the time. That group is now " al Qaeda Central." Dr. Sageman reports that there are dozens left in this group.

The second wave, the fairly well educated expatriates, were trained terrorists who were radicalized in the West during the 1990's. It culminated in the attacks in the U.S. on 9/11/01. These men went to al Qaeda in Afghanistan to be accepted, as have many others exerting bottom-up pressure on the leaders. Only about 15% get accepted as they did, Dr. Sageman found in his research. This group, average age 25, now numbers about 100.

Leaderless Jihad -- the current third wave is a transition phase. Sageman names this post-Iraq invasion group "Terrorist Wannabees," noting that jihad has undergone a complete transformation and has somewhat degraded . This is the poorly educated "homegrown" group not al Qaeda trained. Most were turned away by al Qaeda Central A few were quickly trained and sent home. For example, the British Pakistani terrorists had links to radicals in Kashmir, so had an "in" through fellow-travelers in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

This third wave evolved from the bottom up, is scattered and connected through "virtual" means. The average age is 20; they potentially number in the thousands.

"The undisciplined followers are the leaders. The threat," says Sageman, "is self-limiting and fed by fantasies of wanting to be recognized as heroes."

They have no long term goals or strategy. Sageman believes that the end state is the more unattractive "Taliban" form than those more religious jihadis originally advocating the Salafist state. He noted that such a Salafist State (ousting the West) was the intent of the uprisings in Algeria, the fight against the Russians in Afghanistan, as well as the migration of al Qaeda to fight in the al Anbar province of Iraq.

The evolution of the process of radicalization in a hostile environment into survival mode, enabled by the Internet with its redundancy and anonymity, makes Europe more vulnerable than the U.S. This is due to the culture, social conditions and ability to network offline. Undisciplined, vulnerable targets, they have no ability to progress into a political party. Self-limiting, Sageman believes they have no incentive to compromise. There is the constant push of each new "hothead," with an escalation of atrocities and eventual loss of appeal. Dr. Sageman believes the threat may have already "crested" in France.

To be continued -- Q&A following the PowerPoint.

More on the Sageman story:

1. Washington Monthly's Political Animal -- Kevin Drum recently posted about Leaderless Jihad (2/28/08).
2. Here is the Washington Times article (2/19/08).
3. The Economist wrote an excellent review on 1/31/08 -- "Al-Qaeda/how jihad went freelance." (h/t to PennPressLog).
4. David Isenberg wrote a most useful lengthy review, "A fresh look at terrorism's roots," for Asia Times online (1/19/08). (h/t to War in Context for the link)
5. Leaderless Jihad is an Amazon.com link that contains a full book description and several good reviews.
6. Marc Sageman's Understanding Terror Networks -- the book, from Google.
7. Dr. Marc Sageman -- Speaker's bio from the University of Pennsylvania.

A Discussion with Marc Sageman on Leaderless Jihad, was a program held at the New America Foundation on Feb. 20, 2008. {This link can provide full video or audio of the event. Here is the link to Sageman's *32 page PowerPoint presentation; it includes his main lecture ideas.} To quote the synopsis:

Jihad and 21st Century Terrorism

In the post-September 11 world, Al Qaeda is no longer the central organizing force that aids or authorizes terrorist attacks or recruits terrorists. Rather, it serves as an inspiration for individuals and other groups who have branded themselves with the Al Qaeda name.

Marc Sageman, a former CIA case officer in Afghanistan in the 1980s, builds upon his bestselling book, Understanding Terror Networks, to explain how Islamic terrorism emerges and operates in the twenty-first century. In the recently published Leaderless Jihad, Sageman rejects the idea that certain individuals are predisposed to terrorism. He argues that the individual, outside influence, and group dynamics come together in a four-step process of radicalization that begins with traumatic events that spark moral outrage.

(Cross-posted at South by Southwest.)

Sageman on Leaderless Jihad -- 2 & 3

By Carol Gee

FISA Fights -- Given that U.S. Senators and House members are still in disagreement over how to refine the law on conducting foreign surveillance of "terrorist threats," I wanted return to my series on global jihad. After a brief time-out for the Texas party primaries, I am continuing the process of analyzing the true nature of the threat. To do this I have turned to a new "guru" whose work seems believable and significant to me:

A Discussion with Marc Sageman on Leaderless Jihad, was a program held at the New America Foundation on Feb. 20, 2008. {This link can provide full video or audio of the event. Here is the link to Sageman's 32 page power-point presentation; it includes his main lecture ideas.} To quote the synopsis:

Jihad and 21st Century Terrorism,

In the post-September 11 world, Al Qaeda is no longer the central organizing force that aids or authorizes terrorist attacks or recruits terrorists. Rather, it serves as an inspiration for individuals and other groups who have branded themselves with the Al Qaeda name.

Today's post consists of the second and third parts of a series laying out the most important new ideas and ways of thinking I learned from Marc Sageman -- (see "32 page power-point," pdf link above).

Section 2: "The process became radicalization, mobilization and evolution of the threat over time." -- (pp. 16-22 pdf)

Dr. Sageman explored the dynamics of radicalization, of how people eventually get on the path to political violence. He maintains that these are young men chasing thrills, fantasies of glory and the sense of belonging to an important group and cause. It is a bottom-up process involving four major factors: 1) There is a sense of moral outrage. 2) There is a specific interpretation of the meaning of the precipitating event or events. 3) It resonates with their own personal experience. 4) The mobilization takes place through networks.

Further elaboration of 1) "moral outrage" -- This is anger about a major moral violation; it is not humiliation. It became global after the invasion of Iraq, when before it was confined to the local, involving local police activity. The invasion of Iraq began the activation of Muslim identity, and the local and global reinforce each other.

2) What is the interpretation? It is "war against Islam." It becomes anti-Americanism and anti-semitism. This does not come from the intellectuals or Islamic scholars; it involves the "sound bite" Islam. The radicals did not get into theological debates. There is a consistency with imbedded cultural beliefs that differ between the U.S. and old Europe. Europe projects various national "essences," French-ness, Italianate, etc., and Muslims feel left out. On the other hand, the U.S. myth is of a "melting pot." The American dream is of equal opportunity, and most Muslims believe this is true (Pew research cited by Sageman). Europe has practiced more economic exclusion of Muslim minorities. In addition there are religious differences within Islam. Moderates are more tolerant of religious fundamentalism; the radicals were dominated by Saudis' Salafi fundamentalism.

3) Dr. Sageman discussed a resonance with personal experiences among the radicalized men. Their own personal grievances were "root causes." There has also been a historical legacy with which they are familiar. Muslims in Europe are now in a third generation of unskilled laborers, re-builders of Europe. American Muslims are dominated by middle class professionals. The current average income for a family here is $70,000 annually. Muslims generally are employed in the U.S. opposite to the very high unemployment rate for Muslims in foreign nations. Political contributions include the more generous welfare policies in other developed countries, contributing to idleness and boredom, according to Sageman. There has been a failure of governments' repressive top-down polities, and a resultant Xenophobic backlash. Dr. Sageman reported that most European terrorist plots "were funded with welfare checks." And he cautioned against underestimating the power of high levels of boredom, contributing to the irresistability of violence. Closing with contrasting data about arrest rates in the U.S. vs Europe, Sageman was able to find 60 arrest records for terrorism related charges in the U.S., "mostly through entrapment through the Bureau," Sagemen said. In contrast there were 2,400 arrests in Europe, "with no entrapment." That is six times the arrest rate.

4) Joining jihad, forming networks of trust -- Two-thirds of the men linking into the terrorist networks were expatriates. And Dr. Sageman found that over 90% had some association with the phenomena of the diaspora -- 80% were 2nd and 3rd generation and young expatriates. There was a pre-existing friendship for 70% of the men joining; 20% involved kinship. Sageman characterized the groups as "spontaneous, sel-organized bunches of guys (networks of trust) from the bottom up. It was self-selection and mutual self-recruitment.

Section 3 -- (pp. 23-30 pdf). "The Expatriate vs. Homegrown Trajectories and Mobilization Through Networks of People with Pre-existing Social Bonds or Operational Links." Further elaboration of Sageman's research on 4) above.

The mobilization takes place through networks: The First Wave, the original group, consisted of Osama bin Laden and Dr. al Zawahiri -- the "African Arabs" in Afghanistan and the border area of Pakistan. They were followed by the "Second Wave" of jihadis who took two very different paths into subsequent terror networks. The trajectories are described by Sageman as "Expatriates" and "Homegrown."

The Expatriate Trajectory: The network that eventually culminated in the attacks of 9/11/01 in the U.S. began the 1990's. They were mostly from the Middle East, upwardly and geographically mobile, the "best and brightest." They were raised in religious, caring and middle class families. "Global citizens," they spoke 3 or 4 languages and were skilled in IT. They were sent to the universities of the West, thus separated from their own cultures, leading to being lonely and homesick. Marginalized and excluded from the society of the West, though they adopted the Western lifestyle, they were without relief. So they sought friends, drifting to the mosques for companions, not religion. Eventually they moved in together, ate the same foods, and formed cliques.

The Homegrown Trajectory: In contrast the "homegrown" jihadis were 2nd or 3rd generation men raised and radicalized in Western host countries, but retaining their foreign ideology. They were secular and upwardly mobile, but experienced discrimination and exclusion from the societies in which they were raised. Dropping out of school, they turned to petty crime and drugs, forming gangs. Their collective identity was reactive and resentful. They eventually drifted into religion to escape that situation, according to Dr. Sageman's research findings.

Mobilization through Networks: (See pdf slides 25 through 30 for Sageman's fascinating pictorial representations of the global networks as they have evolved over time). The first of the Second Wave networks were face to face and included homegrown neighborhood gangs, both expatriate and homegrown student activities, and 12 radical study groups -- about half the sample. Then a gradual shift to online networks occurred, with no space or time limits. This has transformed the participation into an egalitarian threat that includes teenagers and women. Chat-rooms became important virtual "invisible hand" networks.

The group dynamics were increased commitment via interactivity: The groups acted as "echo chambers" encouraging mutual escalation. It was about "cause" and "comrades." They gradually slid into a violence dynamic of in-group love and out-group hate. Some of them later went to Iraq and blew themselves up. Dr. Sageman discussed the example of the Madrid group. Five of the 7 went to Madrid to be drug dealers who eventually were radicalized. They were secular at the time of the bombing. One felt John Travolta was his hero.

To be continued -- "The Evolution of Global Islamist Terror"

More on the Sageman story:

1. *Washington Monthly's Political Animal, Kevin Drum recently posted about Leaderless Jihad (2/28/08).
2. The Economist wrote an excellent review on 1/31/08, "Al-Qaeda/ how jihad went freelance," HT to PennPressLog.
3. Leaderless Jihad is an Amazon.com link that contains a full book description and several good reviews.
4. Marc Sageman "Understanding Terror Networks" the book, from Google.
   
5. Book TV on C-SPAN2 showed Sageman's presentation.
6. Dr. Marc Sageman -- Speaker's Bio from the University of Pennsylvania.
   

(Cross-posted at South by Southwest.)

Conservatives squeak out narrow victory in Morocco

By Michael J.W. Stickings

From the G&M (Reuters): "Morocco's conservative Istiqlal party won the most seats in parliamentary elections, allowing it to form the next government with its current ruling coalition allies, final results released on Monday showed. Istiqlal (Independence), a ruling coalition member, won 52 seats, ahead of the opposition Islamist Justice and Development party (PJD) with 46 seats, the Interior Ministry said. The final figures showed a record-low turnout of 37 per cent, an apparent snub of a political system whose leaders are widely seen as aloof and out of touch."

-- For more on the elections, see here. For more on Morocco's interesting political-electoral system, see here.

-- Istiqlal (interestingly enough, given its nationalist and pro-monarchy tendencies) is a member of Centrist Democrat International, formerly Christian Democrat International.

-- Morocco's main Islamist party, the PJD, isn't quite as extreme as Islamist parties elsewhere.

-- Although voters may have stayed home in protest against "aloof and out of touch" leaders, one wonders if they'd prefer non-aloof and oppressive leaders. Be careful what you wish for.

-- This election marked the first time a Jewish woman was a candidate for the Moroccan parliament: Maguy Kakon of the (minor) Social Centre Party.

-- A liberal party (Popular Movement, a member of Liberal International) finished a very respectable third, gaining 16 seats. A leftist party (Socialist Union of Popular Forces) finished fifth, another liberal (and pro-monarchy) party (Constitutional Union) sixth.

-- It must be remembered that Morocco is effectively a monarchy. Its democracy isn't a sham or a farce, but King Mohammed VI is in control.