Wednesday, August 04, 2010

Allawi: Still our safest bet in Iraq?


Before I launch into the blogging, I'd like to introduce myself. I've appeared several times on The Reaction as a guest contributor, and was fortunate enough to be asked to contribute more frequently. I am a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University, where my research focuses on the foreign policy of Muslim states and terrorism; I am also a Fellow with the Truman National Security Project. I have contributed to The Moderate Voice and Huffington Post, and my pieces have appeared in Real Clear World, GOOD, The Duck of Minerva, and the Washington Post/Newsweek's "On Faith" feature. I will be writing primarily on US foreign policy, and international issues.

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Now to today's topic: Iraq.

Despite being an aspiring foreign policy wonk, I at first failed to realize the significance of August 31st, 2010. That is the date the US combat mission in Iraq will end. It is not that I was unaware of this date, or forgot. Instead, it was the near-absence of Iraq from much public discourse, despite continuing tension over the fallout of the spring's parliamentary elections. As I have been arguing since the elections, however, that contest's winner -- Iyad Allawi -- is the safest bet for US efforts to stabilize Iraq, a bet that has only become safer since the elections. The domestic political climate in the United States makes an increased focus on Iraq unlikely, but it could prove valuable for Democrats' political prospects in November.

Shortly after the election, I pointed out the potential for Allawi to stabilize Iraq, and later highlighted the dangers posed by US inaction and al-Maliki returning to power. This latest phase in Iraq's struggle began with March's parliamentary elections. Allawi, a secular Shiite and former Prime Minister who was initially placed in power by the United States, won a slim majority over the incumbent Nouri al-Maliki. Allawi won in part through support from secular-minded Iraqis, but also through the votes of many Sunnis -- who were wary of al-Maliki -- and divisions between al-Maliki and some of the religious parties who had been his partners. The vote was too close to call, however, and al-Maliki refused to relinquish power. The ensuing stalemate continues -- despite intervention by Vice President Biden -- resulting in sectarian tensions and degraded government capabilities.

My arguments about the danger al-Maliki poses still hold true. Al-Maliki proved willing to stir up sectarian sentiment when it benefited him politically, then re-framed himself as an Iraqi nationalist when facing opposition among some Shiites. His attempts after the election to hold on to power, which included threatening comments about his role as commander of the military and a move to disqualify some candidates in Allawi's bloc due to reputed Baathist ties, demonstrate he is still likely to place personal advancement over Iraq's stability.

Yet, there is also much going for Allawi besides not being al-Maliki. Allawi proved a responsible and effective leader, albeit one undone by his U.S. ties. Moreover, his Shiite identity and secular tendencies make him legitimate to a majority of Iraqis and less threatening to its Sunni and Kurdish minorities than the more Islamist al-Maliki. Finally, his Sunni-Shia coalition gives him cross-cutting appeal. This provides Sunnis a stake in the system and Allawi a disincentive to draw on sectarian tensions to increase his political standing, as this would alienate many of his supporters.

This has only become clearer in the months since the election. Al-Maliki continued his dangerous posturing, and Iraq's fragile political system is coming under increasing stress. But there are signs al-Maliki is losing ground to Allawi. The Shiite religious bloc al-Maliki was counting on to deliver a majority recently indicated they may negotiate with Allawi. If these two were to merge, this would give Allawi a clear majority and further dampen sectarian tension, as it would unite secular Shiites, religious Shiites, and Sunnis in one governing coalition.

This is where August 31st comes in. U.S. officials are hoping for a stable political system in Iraq to ensure fighting does not erupt as our troops leave. Despite Biden's admirable efforts, there has been little else in terms of U.S. assistance in resolving Iraq's political impasse, and this is unlikely to change anytime soon. Democrats are trying to paint this as a success in terms of removing the United States from the conflict and are unlikely to advocate enhanced involvement in the country. Republicans, meanwhile, have little to offer in terms of positive policy suggestions, counting on opposition and denunciation to carry them to victory in November.

It would be a grave mistake, however, if Democrats let the potential posed by Allawi to pass by. This is partly about Iraq; absent U.S. assistance, it is very likely al-Maliki will manage to hold on to power, which would only exacerbate the rising violence in that country. It is also about November. A decisive victory by Allawi would help stabilize the country, which can allow Obama to withdraw from Iraq without being accused of leaving mid-mission. And by actively supporting Allawi - -the winner in a relatively fair election -- Democrats can signal their commitment to progressive ideals like freedom and democracy (remember?) as well as their sophisticated approach to international issues. Finally, and most importantly, these moves would show continued commitment to the troops who have served their country in Iraq, even as many Americans -- including Republicans -- seem to want to forget this conflict. If the current trend continues, however, Iraq may turn out to be yet another tragic footnote in the history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East.

(Previously posted at The Huffington Post.)

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Monday, October 26, 2009

Just another day in the life and death of Iraq XCI


Yes, things have gotten better in Iraq. Perhaps even a lot better, if the lack of media coverage is any indication that the bloodshed has subsided. Indeed, we haven't done a "Just another day" post since the end of April, if I remember correctly. Not that this blog is the definitive word on the situation in Iraq, of course, but it's telling, I think, that there just hasn't been that much to write about when it comes to the sort of horrendous violence that rocked Iraq for so long.

Yesterday, though, saw a return to the darker days of years past, with bloody attacks in Baghdad:

Two powerful suicide car bombs near high-profile government offices rocked the capital on Sunday in the deadliest attack here in more than two years, killing at least 147 people and raising fresh worry about the capabilities of Iraq's security services ahead of national elections scheduled for January.

The Ministry of Interior said that in addition to the dead, more than 500 people were injured. Charred bodies, limbs and the smoldering shells of dozens of cars littered the area. The explosions also shattered windows throughout the nearby Mansour Hotel, which houses the Chinese Embassy. Some ceilings collapsed.

The blasts, which the government said bore the signature of al Qaeda in Iraq, most damaged Baghdad's provincial headquarters and the nearby federal Ministry of Justice. Many of the protective blast walls surrounding those buildings collapsed.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visited the site of the attacks and blamed al Qaeda and members of the Baath party. His office said in a statement that the explosions were meant to create instability and to stop the January parliamentary elections.

President Barack Obama called the attacks an attempt to "derail Iraq's progress." He said the U.S. "will stand with Iraq's people and government as a close friend and partner as Iraqis prepare for elections early next year." The president spoke with Mr. Maliki and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani by phone to express his condolences.

Evidently, it's not yet clear who was behind the attacks, though it may very well have been al Qaeda or Sunni insurgents opposed to the positive direction the country seems to be heading in. What is clear, though, is that, while violence continues throughout the country, yesterday was the exception, not the rule, which is a drastic change from the way things were not so very long ago.

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Friday, February 06, 2009

Iraqi election results confirm sectarian divides

By Michael J.W. Stickings

Yeah, so about those oh-so-peaceful provincial elections in Iraq over the weekend, the ones that some on the right were gleefully holding up as proof of success in that war-ravaged country...

Here's Marc "Abu Aardvark" Lynch at Foreign Policy:

Preliminary results from the Baghdad provincial council election have begun to filter out into the Iraqi press. The lead story will probably be that Maliki's Rule of Law list won more than half the seats. But the more important story may be that all of the Sunni lists combined evidently only won four or five seats between them. That, combined with the fiasco in Anbar, could put Sunni frustration firmly back into the center of Iraqi politics – risking alienation from politics, intensified intra-Sunni competition, and perhaps even a return of the insurgency.

So much for those "hopes that the provincial elections would lock in the incorporation of Sunnis into the political process." So much for sectarian reconciliation. The Sunnis are still on the outside, and Maliki is still consolidating Shiite power in Baghdad. And so much even for the prospect of free and fair elections, of legitimate democracy actually taking hold in Iraq:

The unexpectedly strong showing of Maliki may reflect a popular yearning for a strong central government. But add on the unexpectedly strong showing of the Islamic Party in Anbar, and it is difficult to not wonder whether there is more to the strong showing of the incumbent parties than their popularity. Months of "shaping operations" and state-funded patronage may have had something to do with it as well. But either way, the provincial elections seem likely to shift attention to exactly the question we worried about last fall: how will frustrated challengers react to their failure to obtain the share of state power that they had expected?

Time will tell. And that time may be coming soon.

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Sunday, February 01, 2009

Iraq holds peaceful provincial elections, but sectarian tensions remain

By Michael J.W. Stickings

Barack Obama: "I congratulate the people of Iraq on holding significant provincial elections... This important step forward should continue the process of Iraqis taking responsibility for their future."

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In response to yesterday's relatively peaceful, if not entirely successful, provincial elections in Iraq, our friend Cernig provided some typically insightful context and analysis:

The majority of Iraq has voted in provincial elections today, with a very minimum of violence, as I had hoped. Which is great news but unsurprising given the massive security lockdown mounted for the event. Razorwire cordons, security checkpoints, closed airports and a total ban on vehicular traffic in cities - all just to have an election. Still, that it happened at all is encouraging, even if far from the shining victory the American right are hailing it as. I hate to rain on their victory parade but there are a couple of flies in their Mission Accomplished" ointment.

Not least, of course, that such elections might never have happened at all if the Bush administration had had its way. Despite the popularity nowadays of the conservative meme that Bush wanted to bring democracy to Iraq, Paul Bremer, head of the CPA, had wanted to simply keep US-appointed tame politicos in power. But Ayatollah Sistani demanded real elections with thinly veiled hints of a general Shiite insurrection to go with the Sunni-led insurgency if no elections were held, and a quick historical revision swifty ensued.

But there are still deep-seated problems in Iraq which these provincial election's won't touch, or will actually make worse. The Kurdish North didn't participate and neither did the disputed region of Kirkuk. Iraqi troops and Kurdish peshmerga have already faced off there a few times and most analysts see Kurdish aspirations as the primary future source of violence. Then there's the resurgent Sunni minority, where the old and entirely undemocratic tribal power structure is set to be the election winner. And among Shiites, factional infighting which has fractured Maliki's own coalition heavily, looks to be another potential source of future violence. We may not know the full results for a month or more and there are going to be divisive allegations of intimidation, vote-rigging and double-crossing to navigate.

Excuse the long quote, but I think Cernig speaks for many of us here, and he makes some extremely important points. The elections are indeed "a good thing," but they are not the "universal panacea" that some on the right, among the Iraq War's most ardent enthusiasts, think they are.

Those of us who oppose the Iraq War, and the U.S. occupation of Iraq, whether we were reluctantly, hesitantly for the war at the start and then quickly turned against it, as was the case with me, or whether we were against it all along, as was the case with Obama, do not wish to see Iraq fail. There are exceptions, of course, but most of us, I think, want democracy to work there. We want the Iraqi people to be free, we want their rights, including the rights of women and minority groups, to be observed and protected, and we want peace to take hold.

Personally, I do think Iraq is better off without Saddam, whose brutal totalitarianism was among the worst of the past century, but it was the gross mismanagement of the war, driven by the delusions and prejudices of Bush and the warmongers, that allowed the post-Saddam vacuum to be dominated by sectarian civil war. And while there are positive signs to be taken from yesterday's elections, it seems to me that, on the one hand, whatever progress is being made is actually being made in spite of the U.S. war and occupation, if not in direct opposition to it, and that, on the other, many of the problems that have plagued post-Saddam Iraq remain firmly in place, including the sectarianism. The surface of Iraq may be relatively peaceful, at least more peaceful than it was a couple of years ago, but the old resentments and hostilities continue to seethe beneath the surface, threatening, as always, to rise up and destroy the thin veneer of apparent progress, that is, the thin veneer that the warmongers of the American right mistakenly take to be the whole reality of present-day Iraq.

As challenging as it may be, though, what is clear is that it is long past time for full Iraqi self-determination, that is, for the Iraqi people, as divided as they may still be, to assume responsibility for themselves and to determine their own future free from foreign occupation. And that can only happen once the U.S. leaves for good.

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Sunday, June 15, 2008

The latest problems in Iraq

By Michael J.W. Stickings

Update (6/15/08 - 12:51 pm): See WaPo today -- "Powerful Iraqi Cleric Recalibrates Strategy":

The movement of anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr said Saturday that it would not take part in provincial elections this year, one day after it formed a new paramilitary group to fight U.S. troops.

The back-to-back moves suggested that Sadr is trying to bolster his position as the chief opponent of both the American troops in the country and the Iraqi government, following a year in which he ordered his Mahdi Army militia to observe a cease-fire and moved deeper into the political process.

Sadr's aides said he is recalibrating his strategy as the American military drawdown transforms the U.S. role in Iraq.

Yet another massive problem. For more, keep reading...

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The Iraq War and Occupation is supposed to be the key issue this election -- or at least one of the key issues -- but we're not really talking about it all that much, are we?

At least not yet.

Perhaps once the campaign begins in earnest, after the conventions, or after Labor Day, when Obama's and McCain's starkly opposing views will be presented to the American electorate for its consideration.

While Obama has been opposed to the war from the beginning and is calling for withdrawal (as soon as possible, but acknowledging the difficulties that will accompany withdrawal), McCain has been, as you all know, one of the war's chief cheerleaders. He has at times been critical of some of the specifics of the handling of the war -- that is, of some elements of the gross mismanagement of the war by Bush and his warmongering underlings -- but he has been wildly enthusastic about the war in general, including the Surge that began early last year. It is not quite clear to me just what victory would mean for McCain, nor just what he considers to be the war's objectives, but, then, the definition of victory and the war's objectives keeps changing for Bush and his underlings, too. In that respect, McCain is just like the man he seeks to replace. (As Slate's Fred Kaplan has pointed out, McCain is much more of a neocon than -- and much worse than -- Bush.)

Suffice it to say that McCain thinks the war is worth continuing even without an end in sight and that the situation in Iraq is improving as a result of the Surge. But is the situation improving? As I have argued before, the Surge is not working, that is, has not met its stated objectives, specifically the stated objective of enabling a political settlement. While it is true that the security situation has improved in some parts of of the country -- more troops, more security, to a point -- it is certainly not true that the situation in Iraq has improved to the point where there is reason to be optimistic, let alone to the point where we could begin to talk about success in any realistic way.

And, today, there is even less reason to be optimistic:

The Bush administration's Iraq policy suffered two major setbacks Friday when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki publicly rejected key U.S. terms for an ongoing military presence and anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr called for a new militia offensive against U.S. forces.

During a visit to Jordan, Maliki said negotiations over initial U.S. proposals for bilateral political and military agreements had "reached a dead end." While he said talks would continue, his comments fueled doubts that the pacts could be reached this year, before the Dec. 31 expiration of a United Nations mandate sanctioning the U.S. role in Iraq.

The moves by two of Iraq's most powerful Shiite leaders underscore how the presence of U.S. troops has become a central issue for Iraqi politicians as they position themselves for provincial elections later this year. Iraqis across the political spectrum have grown intolerant of the U.S. presence, but the dominant Shiite parties -- including Maliki's Dawa party -- are especially fearful of an electoral challenge from new, grass-roots groups.

Of course, the Shiites want the U.S. out because they're the ones in power in Baghdad, while the Sunnis are less eager to see the U.S. leave because some of them have strategically allied themselves with U.S. forces against al Qaeda and because they're in the minority and are not in power in Baghdad.

Meanwhile, there has been nothing in the way of political settlement, no success in building a genuine democracy in Iraq. The war unleashed long-dormant (because long-suppressed) sectarian tensions and, five years later, not much has changed.

Except that the Iraqis are now in agreement with the American people: It is time -- long past time -- for the U.S. to leave.

Which is something McCain, like Bush, just doesn't seem to understand.

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Sunday, June 08, 2008

Talking to the enemy

By Creature



John McCain and George Bush's man in Iraq,
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a terrorist appeaser.

Who would have thunk it?

(Cross-posted at State of the Day.)

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Wednesday, September 26, 2007

The world according to Nouri

By Michael J.W. Stickings

In what may be simultaneously the understatement and overstatement of the year, Iraqi PM Maliki said this in New York yesterday:

I can't say there is a picture of roses and flowers in Iraq. However, I can say that the greatest victory, of which I am proud... is stopping the explosion of a sectarian war.

He also said that Iranian intervention in Iraq has "ceased to exist".

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This is a good news / bad news situation for President Bush and the warmongers. On the "good" side, they can take credit for what Maliki calls "the greatest victory," namely, the prevention of civil war. If he is right, then a case could be made, similar to the one already being made, that the Surge has been a success and that more Surge will bring more such success. But what if he is wrong? Or, more likely, what if he is being intentionally misleading, that is, what if he is essentially lying?

Maliki is surely right that Iraq is not "a picture of roses and flowers". But it doesn't take much to acknowledge that, and he would have deserved outright ridicule had he attempted to claim otherwise. But has "sectarian war" been prevented? Here, once more, the problem lies in language, definitions. Just what constitutes "sectarian war"? The situation on the groud in Iraq is complicated. There are intra-sectarian divisions just as there are inter-sectarian ones. In Anbar province, for example, Sunni elements, back by the U.S., are fighting al Qaeda, a Sunni terrorist organization. There are similar divisions among the various Shia factions. But here's the assessment contained in the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate:

The Intelligence Community judges that the term "civil war" does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa’ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term "civil war" accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.

Has the situation on the ground improved so dramatically this year that this is no longer the case? Surely not. There has been some success, however temporary, however isolated, but violence across the main sectarian division, Sunni-Shia, continues. It is civil war, of a kind.

So what is Maliki's game?

Is it to paint a rosy picture in order to push the U.S. out or to keep the U.S. in? Out, eventually, but, for now, the Surge serves Maliki's purpose, which is for his opponents, the Sunnis, to be weakened. If Maliki can keep the Shia militias under control, and if Sadr and others can restrain from engaging their opponents, then Maliki and his Shia allies can secure ever greater control in Baghdad while the U.S. hits the Sunni insurgency and sides with some Sunni factions over and against others.

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But what to make of Maliki's claim that Iran is no longer engaged in Iraq? This hurts the ongoing effort of the warmongers to make the case for war with Iran, one of the major planks of which is the controversial, and largely unsubstantiated, claim that Iran is supplying arms to anti-U.S. forces in Iraq, that is, stoking the insurgency and indirectly attacking the U.S. itself. If Iran has committed what are essentially acts of war against the U.S., that is, if Iran started it, then what is to stop the U.S. from hitting back, from acting self-defensively? So the reasoning goes.

But if Iran has not supplied, or is no longer supplying, arms to anti-U.S. forces in Iraq, then this entire argument, this highly questionable rationale for war, crumbles. There is still the matter of Iran's nuclear program, and of Ahmadinejad's lunacy, and of Iran's likely ambitions in the region, but the key for the warmongers is not to have a repeat of Iraq, that is, another preemptive war. The next war, the coming war with Iran, must be seen to be not preemptive but, ultimately, defensive.

Again, though, Maliki may be wrong. (This would mean that Cheney and the rest are right.) If so, or, rather, if he is again being misleading, what is his game? Seemingly to stand in the way of a U.S. war with Iran.

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More and more, what seems to be the case is that Maliki, and those close to him, including Sadr and the various Shia elements aligned with Baghdad, want the U.S. to get the hell out of Iraq as soon as possible. And the best way to push the U.S. out -- or to persuade it to leave sooner rather than later -- is to claim that the situation on the ground is improving, that reconciliation is underway, that the government is secure, and that Iran does not pose an immediate threat to the U.S. Then, and perhaps only then, can Maliki and his allies secure power in Baghdad, establish what would essentially be a Shia-run Iraq, and dominate the country.

That could, in all of this, be the "bad" side for Bush -- no more war in Iraq, no war with Iran -- but also, ultimately, the bad side for Iraq generally.

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