No, it's not (only) occupation

by Peter Henne

In 2003, Robert Pape published an article in The American Political Science Review that claimed suicide terrorism has nothing to do with Islam. Instead, it is caused by military occupations, like those undertaken by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. The article made a big splash in both the policy and academic worlds. Seven years later, Pape continues to influence policy debates, most recently with a piece in Foreign Policy.

Pape's argument goes as follows: suicide terror is not caused by Islam, or any other religion. The greatest supporting example for this is use of suicide terrorism by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a nationalist Hindu group in Sri Lanka. Pape argues suicide terror is a rational tactic in the face of a stronger foe that is occupying a group's homeland. Said occupation makes people very angry, and suicide terrorist attacks are the best means through which to remove the occupying forces as it is an effective tactic. Pape's argument has everything an academic could hope for: it is straightforward, relevant, and was picked up by policymakers and pundits. The one problem, however, is that it isn't completely accurate.

Pape's theory has drawn many critics. Mia Bloom argued that the primary driver of suicide terrorism is groups' competition for public support, not occupation. Max Abrahms questioned whether terrorism is as effective as Pape says. Assaf Moghadam put together a fair--but withering--critique of Pape's analysis, and presented an alternative analysis that points to globalization and radical Islamist ideology. And an excellent methodological critique by several scholars pointed to issues in Pape's argument with selecting on the dependent variable.

So what are the problems with Pape's argument? He is right that Islam doesn't cause suicide terrorism. But there are a few issues with ascribing it to a rational response to occupation. First, the definition of occupation is a bit broad. The US in Iraq would count, but should cases of separatist tension--such as Chechnya, and Kurdish regions of Turkey--count as occupation? Or is it actually ethnic divisions combined with other factors, a less parsimonious but more accurate explanation.

Second, Pape's explanation would struggle to explain transnational attacks, like 9/11 or the flood of foreign fighters to Iraq after the US invasion. One could say that this is a case of anger over occupation leading to attacks outside the occupied territory. But what motivates someone to take an interest in the occupation of other countries, to the extent of killing themselves to stop it? Maybe a transnational ideology like the radical religious one adopted by al-Qaida (AQ)?

The usual concern with policymakers picking up on inaccurate academic theories is that it will prompt them to implement dangerous policies. In the case of Pape, though, his policy suggestions involve ceasing occupation of other countries and focusing only on the United States' vital interests. While I am a bit more of an internationalist than Pape, I have a hard time finding anything horribly wrong with these policies.

There are two areas of concern, though. First, AQ--and similar groups that could emerge in the future--may continue to try and attack the United States in the absence of an occupation. Second, viewing domestic terrorist activities--like the LTTE or Turkey's PKK--as cases of occupation may be counterproductive. These conflicts were not always caused by military invasion of a territory, but the neglect or repression of a minority group by the central government. Pointing to occupation may preclude institutional changes that can resolve the conflict short of dismembering a country.

So Pape has done us a great service by dispelling myths about Islam causing suicide terrorism, and provoking great debate and analysis of this phenomenon. But the foreign policy community should follow academia's lead and subject this grand claim to the sort of scrutiny any such argument requires.

Treading water in Sri Lanka

by Peter Henne

Last week, a commission began investigating the final phase of a horrendous decades-long civil war. This war, which ended last year, caused tens of thousands of deaths, prompted military interventions from a regional power, drew in a transnational diaspora, and spawned numerous refugees. The war's aftermath presents significant implications for the international community concerning counterinsurgency, terrorism and refugee flows. Unfortunately, it occurred in Sri Lanka, a country that receives negligible, if any, attention in US media or political discussions. If the international community were to focus on this crisis, however, diplomatic pressure to address the grievances driving the conflict combined with reconstruction aid could yield tremendous benefits.

Tensions between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils in Sri Lanka began after independence from Great Britain. The colonial government empowered the Tamils at the expense of the Sinhalese, which generated a great amount of resentment. Contention between the groups erupted into a civil war in the 1980s that continued until recently; the primary combatant on the Tamil side was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist group characterized by destructive attacks and a pioneering use of suicide bombings. Indian forces intervened in the late 1980s, but their troops did little to stabilize the country. After almost two decades of abortive peace agreements, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa launched an all-out offensive against the LTTE, with Sri Lanka's civilians caught in the middle.

The turmoil continued after the war ended. President Rajapaksa easily won re-election in January 2010. Yet, his opponent -- General Sarath Fonseka -- was recently convicted by a military court, an event some see as politically-motivated; Rajapaksa also attacked the UN over its attempts to investigate government actions during the war and set up his own commission, which many believe will be inadequate. And Tamils have expressed concerns over continuing government activities in Tamil-populated areas and perceived threats to their demographic and cultural integrity.

The situation in Sri Lanka resembles a swimmer treading water, neither sinking nor rising. There are several reasons why we should care about this, beyond altruistic concerns. First is what it says about counterinsurgency tactics. The Sri Lankan government defeated the LTTE through brute force, rather than a restrained civilian-centric strategy. This in part shows the inherent tragedy of war, as "good guys" are often hard to find and conflict rarely ends in a satisfying and morally-sound manner. As I have said before, this presents unwelcome lessons for US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Namely, is it possible to put down an insurgency without resorting to the Sri Lankan government's tactics? Is the best we can hope for a low-level equilibrium? These are questions, not answers. If international silence over the Sri Lankan civil war continues, this could indicate tacit agreement that the government's rough tactics were acceptable, or at the least unavoidable.

Second, the Sri Lanka crisis speaks to worries over both terrorism and refugees. While the worldwide Tamil diaspora for the most part rejected the LTTE's brutal tactics, the group likely gained some support from Tamils abroad. Also, many Tamils fled the country during the fighting, including a ship-borne group that recently reached Canada. Canadian officials want to ensure the safety of the refugees, but also worry about terrorist entry into the country. International inaction could both allow LTTE cells to continue operation -- possibly serving as a model for other transnational terrorist networks -- and lead to the denial of asylum to legitimate refugees.

This treading of water is also apparent in US attention to the crisis. President Obama called on the Sri Lankan government to protect its civilians in May of 2009, and a November 2009 Congressional resolution expressed similar concerns. But there has been little beyond that.

With all the international and domestic problems we are facing, and a mid-term election looming, can we really expect US leaders to devote resources to this crisis? Probably not. That being said, of the various international concerns out there, this one may be relatively easy to address. Major combat is over, so it would not require military intervention in an ongoing war. And despite some problems, Sri Lanka is a democracy, so the United States would not be required to partner with a regime of dubious integrity. Diplomatic pressure and the threat of economic sanctions combined with aid for combat-affected areas could push the Sri Lankan government to accept the UN mission while providing help in recovering from the war.

Achieving a just resolution to this war, and repairing war-ravaged areas of Sri Lanka, would help the Sri Lankan people and provide a beneficial model for other cases of conflict resolution. Inaction, however, will produce a perpetuation of the tragic status quo in which the international community looks on as untold numbers of civilians die.

(Previously posted at The Huffington Post)