Afgoneistan

By Carl 

To understand Afghanistan, it helps to understand a little economics:

Consider these facts from a highly intelligent forthcoming book, War Front to Store Front, by Paul Brinkley: In 2009, Afghanistan had a nominal GDP of $10 billion. Of that number, 60% was foreign aid. The cultivation of poppy and the production and export of raw heroin--all of which is informal and underground--accounted for 30%. That leaves 10%, or $1 billion, of self-sustaining, legitimate economic activity. During the same year, the U.S. military spent $4 billion per month to protect a country with a real annual economic output of $1 billion.

"Kabul is a metaphor for the country," Brinkley said to me. "It is a city sized for 500,000 people. It has grown to 8 million, who have been drawn to the city by the massive influx of foreign money, military and nonmilitary. But that money is going to slow down very significantly soon. What happens then?"

Now let's translate that to American terms: Imagine the entire population of the city of New York crammed into Harlem, because jobs are plentiful there and someone is paying $48 for every $1 you produce, and you get to keep the dollar.

Hell, who wouldn't jump at that?

But what happens when the tap turns off? Now, you're producing $1 for a population 16 times what your neighborhood can accommodate.

Most people will leave at that point, to be sure, but enough people will remain behind because, well, they can't easily leave. Maybe they have a sick family member. Maybe that 12.5 cents is more than they'd make back in Bay Ridge. One thing is certain, people are going to get angry and people are going to get sick, and people are going to become desperate.

Read more »

James Inhofe, like others on the right, slams Obama's Afghanistan trip, provides yet more evidence he's a relentless idiot, a shameless hyper-partisan hack, or some combination thereof

By Michael J.W. Stickings

So, as you may know, President Obama is in Afghanistan -- or was, I'm not sure of his schedule, and he may very well have left already.

On the one-year anniversary of the remarkable mission that resulted in Obama bin Laden's death, which he himself ordered and for which he deserves enormous credit despite all the hypocritical whining from conservatives, he met with U.S. troops at Bagram air base, telling them that "when we see our homeland violated, when we see our fellow citizens killed, then we understand what we have to do," and also that, alas, "the battle's not yet over."

He also addressed the American people, and the world, saying that "we've traveled through more than a decade under the dark cloud of war. Yet here, in the pre-dawn darkness of Afghanistan, we can see the light of new day on the horizon," a message of hope in a place where there isn't much of it -- and where he himself has continued a war seemingly without purpose, even if he is also ending it.

He also met with President Karzai and signed a partnership agreement with the Afghan government for the post-withdrawal period.

The trip was unannounced but certainly made a lot of sense. It's something any U.S. president would have done, and the anniversary of the death of bin Laden provided an obvious opportunity.

But of course conservatives refuse to give Obama credit for anything, including bin Laden's killing, and criticize him for everything. It's what they've done throughout his first teram and they're doing just that over this trip, saying that he's politicizing -- that is, trying to score political points off, bin Laden's death. (As if Romney appearing with 9/11 self-mythologizer Giuliani at a fire station in New York is somehow... not political? Yes, Republicans' political posturing really is breathtakingly inconsistent.)

You can find countless examples of conservatives huffing and puffing -- and, really, just whining over Obama's massive success (like here) -- or you can just read what Republican Sen. James Infofe said, which in its grotesque idiocy pretty much sums it all up:

We've seen recently that President Obama has visited college campuses in an attempt to win back the support of that age group since he has lost it over the last three years," Inhofe said in a statement. "Similarly, this trip to Afghanistan is an attempt to shore up his national security credentials, because he has spent the past three years gutting our military."

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"The security improvements and the killing of Osama bin Laden a year ago are great American victories that should not be politicized," he said.

So, basically, Obama shouldn't be allowed to campaign anywhere, shouldn't talk national security at all, and shouldn't even mention the killing of bin Laden. Not because these things are inherently wrong, mind you, but simply because he's a Democrat. You think Inhofe, or any of these other Republicans, would be criticizing a Republican president for doing any of this? Please. Did they criticize President Bush for his relentless politicizing of 9/11 and the "war on terror"? Of course not.

They're fucking hypocrites. And so transparently partisan, and in such a desperate way, as to be utterly ridiculous.

As usual.

NATO airstrike kills Afghan civilians. Yes, it's time to end this war.

By Michael J.W. Stickings

NYT:

Afghan officials said Sunday that a NATO airstrike had killed 14 civilians, most of them women and children, in the southern province of Helmand on Saturday night.

Local officials said the strike was aimed at Taliban fighters and missed, hitting two family homes.

But in a conflicting account, a high-level NATO official said Sunday night that nine civilians were killed in the strike, which was aimed at five insurgents who attacked a coalition foot patrol and killed a Marine. The insurgents continued to fire from inside a compound when NATO forces called in the strike.

"Unfortunately, the compound the insurgents purposefully occupied was later discovered to house innocent civilians," the official, Maj. Gen. John Toolan, commander of NATO forces in the Southwest region, said in a statement. The general apologized for the civilian deaths on behalf of all coalition forces, including Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top coalition commander in Afghanistan, and said the investigation into the episode was continuing.

"While I know there is no price on human life, we will ensure that we make amends with the families in accordance with Afghan culture," he said. 

This isn't about "us" being as bad as "them," it's about the quagmire the Afghan War has become, that it has been for a long time now. And making "amends" just won't cut it. It's time to get out.

Now, I'm not sure Hamid Karzai's "last warning" really means anything. NATO (and particularly the U.S.) will stay in Afghanistan as long as it wants.

But what is the point of staying? What is the war for?

There are several answers to that question -- including supporting the country's "government" (i.e., Karzai, who barely controls Kabul), rooting out the Taliban in the name of the "war on terror," building a sustainable state with a legitimate democratic government, as well as a healthy civil society, etc.) -- but not a single one is satisfactory anymore.

It may be impossible to avoid civilian casualties entirely, but this latest incident serves as a reminder of just how pointless the war has become.

Of air strikes and political footballs

By Peter Henne

Sometimes I worry I'm too critical of both the government and major opposition figures in Pakistan, so take this with a grain of salt. But many leaders in that country seem willing to stir up either anti-American or religious sentiment (or both) to gain domestic support and distract potential critics.

This includes the government appealing to concerns over "blasphemy" in order to limit internet access. It also, unfortunately, includes attacks on US and NATO conduct in the war in Afghanistan. The most recent incident involves the Pakistani leadership criticizing a NATO air strike on Pakistani soil that killed numerous militants. This comes in the context of increased US drone strikes in Pakistan, partially in response to the Pakistani government's inability (or unwillingness) to deal with militants. The common assumption among observers of this conflict is that Pakistan secretly agreed to such actions but publicly denounces them.

The political logic is clear. The Pakistani government does not want to admit it cannot deal with the militant threat, and is unable to admit it actually benefits from these air strikes. So the government openly opposes these activities, counting on US dependence on both the strikes and Pakistan's tacit consent to prevent tensions with the United States. A similar move could be seen in Pakistani President Zardari's public feud with British leader David Cameron over the latter's critique of Pakistan's counter-terrorism efforts, which some saw as an attempt on the part of Zardari to distract attention from government inaction on the country's horrific floods. And, as seen in some of Afghan President Karzai's actions, this rhetoric may gain Pakistan's leadership sympathy from international audiences wary of the admittedly morally-questionable drone program.

The fact that these actions by the Pakistani leadership are politically beneficial is what disturbs me. It would be one thing if this was principled opposition to military actions that could harm civilians, but I doubt it's the case. It is likely just another example of leaders who are less-than-ideal US partners using both their own people's welfare and the lives and efforts of US and allied troops for political gain.

As so often seems to be the case, I'm not surprised, but I am disappointed.

Two types of corruption in Afghanistan

by Peter Henne

Things just keep getting more complicated in Afghanistan. Amid the furor over an Afghan official implicated in a high-level corruption scandal, a New York Times article revealed the official had CIA ties. Yesterday, Afghan President Hamid Karzai compared the short-lived arrest of this official to Soviet-era actions. Karzai has also established a council to initiate talks with the Taliban, and today's reporting indicates the United States is taking a permissive view on corruption in the country in order to gain allies against the insurgents.

In a counterinsurgency (or COIN) campaign--especially one in Afghanistan--some complication is to be expected. There is a trade-off between ensuring our partners in the country are virtuous and defeating the brutal insurgents threatening the Afghan people. Local elites--a.k.a. "warlords"--are essential in securing the countryside, but tend to favor private goods for their supporters over public ones. And as distasteful as it might be, some talks with the Taliban may be needed, as long as they do not involve compromising on human rights in the country.

It's important, though, that US leaders don't confuse pragmatic COIN strategies with an easy way out of Afghanistan. This is because there are two types of "corruption." The first is that of the warlords, who stabilize areas in order to profit from them; this can involve extracting resources from the populace in a less than savory manner, but also includes fighting off challengers for control--namely the Taliban. The other type is the corruption of central officials: Karzai and his ilk. It is the same concept, but on a larger scale; as long as Karzai is the most powerful authority in Afghanistan, he will continue reaping private goods. This, however, involves tolerating Taliban control of some areas in order to maintain his hold on the rest of the country, and undermining the power of local elites--who are potential competitors--even if this means a lack of security for the populace.

And thus the distinction. Letting Karzai's indiscretions slide will result in instability throughout Afghanistan, and possibly a Taliban safe-haven. Looking the other way concerning the warlords' problematic actions will not be ideal, but can help to stabilize regions under their control, even if the central government is not directly involved.

It is important as US COIN strategy progresses over the next few months that policymakers realize this distinction, and don't let the pragmatism of working with local elites translate into tolerance for Karzai's corruption.

A preemptive plea against praising Karzai

By Peter Henne

I'm interested to see what the reaction will be to Afghan President Hamid Karzai's ban on private security companies. Karzai is apparently tired of sharing the legitimate use of force in Afghanistan, and has ordered all such actors to cease operations within four months. This includes notorious US-based companies like Xe (formerly known as Blackwater), as well as Afghan groups.

The Washington Post covers the usual concerns. Many worry that this move will undermine what little stability the country has, strengthening the Taliban as the people turn to them for protection. At the same time, there have been notorious incidents of private security firms killing civilians and ignoring local regulations, so criticism of these groups is hardly unreasonable.

I anticipate this action being cheered by many on the left. Private security forces have become a symbol of Bush-era failures. A move away from their use could be seen as correcting for international overstretch in US foreign policy; see my colleague Fouad Pervez's useful analysis for more on this point.

I share these concerns about the use of private security forces. At the same time, anyone who has read anything I've written should not be surprised when I say I don't agree with criticisms of US military interventions; I think they are often necessary, if tragic, and am hesitant to join in a call for a withdrawal from Afghanistan. At the moment, my biggest criticism of the war is over whether our troops should be fighting to prop up this guy.

What worries me about Karzai's move is that the distaste for private security forces may lead some to perceive Karzai as a champion for seemingly-progressive values. Instead, this ban needs to be seen for what it is: the latest in a string of cynical and self-serving policies by a leader who seems more concerned about his own prosperity than the welfare of his people or the international forces fighting to secure Afghanistan. The 2009 Presidential election was widely seen as flawed--likely due to Karzai's efforts--and he has reacted to US calls to clean up his act since then by threatening to join the Taliban. Now he is attempting to appear the Afghan nationalist while eliminating actors outside of his control. Whatever your views on the war, please don't praise Karzai.

How to avoid undermining our own Afghan strategy

Guest post by Peter Henne

Peter S. Henne is a Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project and a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University.

Peter is pretty much a regular contributor now. This is his eighth guest post at The Reaction.

He has previously blogged about Sri Lanka, the Afghan War, the Left and religion, Obama and the Nobel Peace Prize, Marc Thiessen, Iraqi identity politics, and the U.S. Af-Pak strategy in Waziristan. 

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With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan looming, concrete steps that would facilitate stabilization of the country are in high demand. Two possibilities that have gained some traction are power-sharing with the Taliban and a strategy that breaks off moderate elements of the group. Pressure to speed up disengagement from Afghanistan may lead U.S. policymakers to grasp at any available options, including pursuing these policies simultaneously. While both have some chance of proving effective, they would be counter-productive if implemented together, something policymakers must keep in mind as they move forward with their plans.

Successful counterinsurgency requires a great amount of time and resources. The U.S. mission in Afghanistan is running short on both. As a result, policymakers may aspire to something less than complete victory; that is, a classic counterinsurgency, which eliminates insurgents, develops infrastructure, and eventually stabilizes the country, might not be viable, and the U.S. could settle for second-best.

One second-best strategy is power-sharing with insurgents, which has arisen several times in debates over Afghanistan. Such a policy is seen as increasingly attractive to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who has grown concerned about the stability of his rule. This approach makes sense in theory: it increases the benefits militants receive from working with the government even if the outcome is not completely in line with the government's wishes.

Power-sharing approaches are occasionally effective. There have been attempts to end ethnic strife by setting up a central government that is split among the combatants. And participation in an open political process may have a moderating effect, turning formerly radical militants into responsible actors. This partly constituted the U.S. strategy in Iraq, which involved reaching out to Sunni militants to bring them into the political process and give them a stake in the country's stability.

The other strategy is disaggregating the militants. This would involve breaking off elements of the Taliban that are not devoted to the group's radical Islamist ideology. Disaggregation is premised on the belief that insurgent groups are not monolithic, with moderates present in even the most violent insurgency. There are always true-believers dedicated to the group’s mission and strongly influenced by its ideology, whether Islamist or Marxist. Many other insurgents, though, join for less principled reasons. Some see the insurgency as a chance to make money, or redress personal grievances. Others join for reasons that have nothing to do with the fighting, such as social pressure.

Terrorism experts like Marc Sageman argue that a similar dynamic exists in al Qaeda, with numerous members drawn to the group through social networks. And a strategy based on disaggregation proved effective in Iraq. Most Sunni militants were fighting for reasons unrelated to al Qaeda's global agenda, and were distressed with the brutality of the local al Qaeda franchise, al Qaeda in Iraq. The United States capitalized on this situation, reaching out to Iraqi Sunnis and encouraging them to fight against al Qaeda in Iraq. Disaggregation strategies thus arguably reduce a group's numbers and tip the balance of power towards moderates, undermining militants' strength.

These two approaches seem complementary. One could expect a strategy based on their combination to sap a group of its members, increase moderates' power, and decrease incentives to keep fighting. In reality, however, they would undermine each other and the broader mission.

The disconnect between the strategies can be understood by thinking in terms of costs and benefits. With the power-sharing strategy, the government increases the benefits of ceasing hostilities, which often involves some autonomy for insurgents. Yet, this also requires the government to avoid direct confrontation, leaving the insurgents' goals and structure intact. The disaggregation approach, in turn, increases the benefits for moderate insurgents who cease their struggle. This could occur by paying off insurgents or by putting pressure on true-believers and discouraging less committed members.

The problem should now be apparent. Power-sharing would benefit insurgents who stop fighting, which would translate into benefits for true believers who could claim victory. This would vindicate their approach to the conflict and weaken the hands of moderates, making any attempt to break them off from the group impossible. In the case of Afghanistan, it would grant the Taliban control of certain areas, keeping the true believers in power while undercutting moderates. This would give hard-liners in the Taliban an even stronger position than before, as they would no longer face opposition from the U.S. forces or intra-group competition.

As Obama weighs his options for what is intended to be the final stage of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, the dissonance between these two approaches should be remembered. Despite U.S. assurances it would not negotiate with the worst of the militants, it would be all too easy to speed up U.S. withdrawal by buying off some militants and giving others a part in the political process. At best this approach would bring temporary stability; at worst, it would strengthen the most radical Taliban factions and prolong the misery of the Afghan people. Instead, disaggregation should be pursued without any power-sharing with the Taliban. This strategy has worked in the past, and would likely be effective in cutting the Taliban off from its potential support base. It will be neither easy nor perfect, but with a conflict like Afghanistan, it may be our best bet.

The courage to get the hell out of Afghanistan

By Michael J.W. Stickings

If you missed it, make sure to check out Bob Herbert's excellent column in Friday's Times on the state of the war in Afghanistan. It deserves to be read (and thought through) in full, but here's some of it:

There is no good news coming out of the depressing and endless war in Afghanistan. There once was merit to our incursion there, but that was long ago. Now we're just going through the tragic motions, flailing at this and that, with no real strategy or decent end in sight.

The U.S. doesn't win wars anymore. We just funnel the stressed and underpaid troops in and out of the combat zones, while all the while showering taxpayer billions on the contractors and giant corporations that view the horrors of war as a heaven-sent bonanza. BP, as we've been told repeatedly recently, is one of the largest suppliers of fuel to the wartime U.S. military.

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What's happening in Afghanistan is not only tragic, it's embarrassing. The American troops will fight, but the Afghan troops who are supposed to be their allies are a lost cause. The government of President Hamid Karzai is breathtakingly corrupt and incompetent — and widely unpopular to boot.

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There is no overall game plan, no real strategy or coherent goals, to guide the fighting of U.S. forces. It's just a mind-numbing, soul-chilling, body-destroying slog, month after month, year after pointless year. The 18-year-olds fighting (and, increasingly, dying) in Afghanistan now were just 9 or 10 when the World Trade Center and Pentagon were attacked in 2001.

Americans have zoned out on this war. They don't even want to think about it. They don't want their taxes raised to pay for it, even as they say in poll after poll that they are worried about budget deficits. The vast majority do not want their sons or daughters anywhere near Afghanistan.

Why in the world should the small percentage of the population that has volunteered for military service shoulder the entire burden of this hapless, endless effort? The truth is that top American officials do not believe the war can be won but do not know how to end it. So we get gibberish about empowering the unempowerable Afghan forces and rebuilding a hopelessly corrupt and incompetent civil society.

Our government leaders keep mouthing platitudes about objectives that are not achievable, which is a form of deception that should be unacceptable in a free society. 

I will admit that, like many, I was an early supporter of the Afghan War. But I was a supporter specifically of the effort to topple the Taliban government and to remove al Qaeda from its safe haven. Since then, though, it has been a badly mismanaged war, largely because Bush shifted focus to Iraq, but also because the war, with the Taliban overthrown and al Qaeda pushed back into the mountains and the Pakistani border regions, lacks a compelling purpose, let alone any sort of realistic objective.

As I wrote after President Obama's West Point speech in December, while there was good reason (a solid, defensible rationale) to go to war, and while the war, early on, may have been legitimate (in other words, the U.S. was justified in going to war to confront an enemy that had attacked it), but the war now is not the war then. And the war has only gotten worse and seemingly more pointless.

Writes Herbert, "[i]f we don't have the courage as a people to fight and share in the sacrifices when our nation is at war, if we're unwilling to seriously think about the war and hold our leaders accountable for the way it is conducted, if we're not even willing to pay for it, then we should at least have the courage to pull our valiant forces out of it."

Such courage seems nowhere to be found, though, and now, as the Times is reporting, there is more reason for the U.S. and its allies to stay, and that is to exploit the country for its natural resources:

The United States has discovered nearly $1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits in Afghanistan, far beyond any previously known reserves and enough to fundamentally alter the Afghan economy and perhaps the Afghan war itself, according to senior American government officials.

The previously unknown deposits — including huge veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like lithium — are so big and include so many minerals that are essential to modern industry that Afghanistan could eventually be transformed into one of the most important mining centers in the world, the United States officials believe.

An internal Pentagon memo, for example, states that Afghanistan could become the "Saudi Arabia of lithium," a key raw material in the manufacture of batteries for laptops and BlackBerrys.

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"There is stunning potential here," Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the United States Central Command, said in an interview on Saturday. "There are a lot of ifs, of course, but I think potentially it is hugely significant."

Potential. Sure. Just don't expect the Afghan people to benefit, and don't expect the killing to stop. The war will continue, if not to defeat the terrorists, then to fill the coffers of multi-national industry and the politicians who profit off the global corporatocracy, including in Washington.

Does Hamid Karzai have a drug problem?

By Michael J.W. Stickings

Maybe so, says Peter Galbraith, former U.N. envoy to Afghanistan:

In an interview on MSNBC's "The Daily Rundown," Peter Galbraith described Karzai as "off-balance" and "emotional." Galbraith also called for President Barack Obama to vastly limit Karzai’s power to appoint officials within the war-torn country until he proves himself a reliable partner to the U.S.

"He's prone to tirades. He can be very emotional, act impulsively. In fact, some of the palace insiders say that he has a certain fondness for some of Afghanistan's most profitable exports," said Galbraith, in an apparent reference to opium or heroin.

When asked whether he meant Karzai has a substance abuse problem, Galbraith responded: "There are reports to that effect. But whatever the cause is, the reality is that he is -- he can be very emotional."

Well, it would explain, in part, his recent, well, instability, if I may put it nicely. (And, drugs or no drugs, he does seem to be immensely unreliable, and possibly not worth the investment. Is he just another would-be American puppet -- Iraq's Ahmed Chalabi comes instantly to mind, along with America's various favoured tyrants during the Cold War, many in Latin America -- who duplicitously goes his own way and undermines American interests?)

Laura Rozen has more.

Be careful what you ask for, Mr. Karzai

By Michael J.W. Stickings

Talk about disrespect:

KABUL, Afghanistan -- President Hamid Karzai lashed out at his Western backers for the second time in three days, accusing the U.S. of interfering in Afghan affairs and saying the Taliban insurgency would become a legitimate resistance movement if the meddling doesn't stop.

Mr. Karzai, whose government is propped up by billions of dollars in Western aid and nearly 100,000 American troops fighting a deadly war against the Taliban, made the comments during a private meeting with about 60 or 70 Afghan lawmakers Saturday.

At one point, Mr. Karzai suggested that he himself would be compelled to join the other side -- that is, the Taliban -- if the parliament didn't back his controversial attempt to take control of the country's electoral watchdog from the United Nations, according to three people who attended the meeting, including an ally of the president.

Mr. Karzai blamed the lawmakers' resistance to his move on a foreign conspiracy, they said. The Afghan president's latest remarks came less than 24 hours after he assured U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that he was committed to working with the U.S. That phone call was precipitated by a similar -- but less vitriolic -- anti-Western diatribe Mr. Karzai delivered earlier last week.

So, basically, Karzai is talking out of both sides of his mouth while threatening his own country's parliament, trying to ensure that he can fix elections at will and ensure the preservation of his own rule, and attacking the hand that feeds him, the very hand that put him in power in the first place, behind that hand's back.

Of course, the hand, in this case the U.S., is bound to find out about the attacks. And I tend to think that the U.S., instead of continuing to prop him and his corrupt rule up, should tell him to fuck off. Diplomatically, of course. And that goes for every other country involved in the Afghan War, too, every other country fighting this seemingly pointless war in support of an ungrateful jackass, every other country losing lives to support a would-be tyrant, every other country pouring money into a barely legitimate kleptocracy that governs Kabul and little else.

Call Karzai's bluff. He needs the U.S., because he's nothing without its support, and he knows it. And he isn't about to switch sides and throw in his desperate lot with the Taliban, who would never accept him, never trust him, and certainly never allow him to rule.

There's no doubt that Afghanistan is better off without the Taliban in control, and without al Qaeda using the country as a launching pad for its activities. But I suspect that the country would be better off without Karzai, too.

Obama visits Afghanistan, challenges Karzai, and talks up the war

By Michael J.W. Stickings

"In Afghanistan," headlines the Times, "Obama Presses Karzai to Fight Corruption."

Good luck with that, Mr. President, but I suspect you'd have about as much of a chance for success pressing McConnell and Boehner to fight extremism and obstructionism in the GOP.

Honestly, I'm not sure which is in worse shape, Afghanistan or the Republican Party.

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As for Obama's "surprise" visit to Afghanistan:

[He] rallied the troops in Afghanistan during his first visit to the country as commander-in-chief today, acknowledging both military successes and personal sacrifices, and noting, "the United States of America does not quit once it starts on something."

Well, it was important for him to make an appearance there, not least given that so much of his presidency has been dedicated to domestic issues, however important themselves, in recent weeks/months, and I suppose it's important for him to try to boost the morale of the troops by standing firm on the mission, and by saying all the right things from a flag-waving perspective, but... come on... America doesn't ever quit? Sure it does. It quit in Tora Bora, it quit in Iraq (or, rather, on Iraq, by not having a plan for the occupation and counter-insurgency), it quit in Afghanistan once attention was diverted to Iraq. Okay, maybe America just quit under Bush and now won't under Obama, but it's not about quitting or not quitting, it's about a clear purpose for being there as well as defined objectives and if not a definite sense of what would constitute victory at least a realistic sense of the war's end.

And is there a clear purpose, or rationale, for the continuing conduct of the war? I still say no -- and I say that as an initial supporter of the war.

I won't get into the details here, but I outlined my objections after Obama's pro-war West Point speech back in December:

In making the case for war, Obama sounded at times a lot like Bush. Yes, there was good reason (a solid, defensible rationale) to go to war, and the war, early on, may have been legitimate (in other words, the U.S. was justified in going to war to confront an enemy that had attacked it), but the war now is not the war then. Back then, it was about removing the Taliban from power and denying al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan. That was accomplished, quickly, even if Karzai's government doesn't really run the country in any meaningful way. It is not clear what it is about now. Rebuilding the country? Propping up the government? Holding back the Taliban?

In the absence of a clear purpose, or rationale, for the continuing conduct of the war, there is an astonishing lack of legitimacy for the war. And even if the rationale for the war is to hold back the Taliban, as well as to maintain some semblance of stability in neighbouring Pakistan (which may descend into chaos even if the U.S. remains engaged militarily in Afghanistan), it isn't clear that continuing to wage the war, let alone escalating it, is worth the cost, both monetary and human.

So what now? Well, we get the president waving the flag, pumping up the troops, and pressing Karzai. Great. But so what?

I'm sure the troops, American and otherwise, are generally performing admirably, but, honestly, what the hell's the point? Just saying you won't quit won't win the war -- and certainly doesn't provide the war with a genuine and realistic purpose.

An Afghan strategy progressives could love

Guest post by Peter Henne 

Peter S. Henne is a Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project and a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University.

This is his fifth guest post at The Reaction. He has previously blogged about Sri Lanka, the Afghan War, the Left and religion., and Obama and the Nobel Peace Prize.

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In his State of the Union address, President Obama reiterated his support for the increasingly contentious U.S. presence in Afghanistan, even in the face of simmering domestic issues like health-care reform and the economy. Beneath this official show of support, though, recent news articles indicate a potential behind-the-scenes debate concerning the nature of U.S. activities in that country. At the risk of being overdramatic, the fate of U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan may rest on the outcome of this bureaucratic dispute. One of the options being presented, however -- a decentralized strategy of tribal engagement -- has the potential to be both effective and politically viable, and deserves further attention.

A week or so ago, The Washington Post ran an article on U.S. outreach to tribal leaders in Afghanistan. The story discussed the work of Maj. Jim Gant, a Green Beret, and his efforts to assist tribal networks with both "local disputes" and resistance against Taliban and al Qaeda elements. Maj. Gant's work has generated a great amount of attention among military officials, who see in it a means of mobilizing the Afghan people to contribute to their own defense. Interestingly, a large Pashtun tribe recently agreed to fight the Taliban in return for U.S. aid.

A more recent story, however -- also in the Post -- discussed resistance to such efforts among civilian U.S. policymakers. According to the story, Karl Eikenberry -- the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan -- was hesitant to expand U.S. military cooperation with tribal networks, due to a preference to work with a central Afghan government. It was unclear if this is the same program discussed in the earlier article, although there are significant parallels between the two stories. Moreover, U.S. officials are also debating negotiation with Taliban leaders, as well as engagement with lower level Taliban fighters, to reintegrate them into Afghan society.

The debate involves two drastically different approaches to situations like Afghanistan. The State Department's approach involves building up central governmental institutions, focusing U.S. efforts on establishing a (hopefully democratic) state. The approach that seems to be favored by the military is a decentralized strategy of enhancing local capabilities, even if it is at the expense of the central government. The issue of outreach to the Taliban, in turn, rests uncomfortably between the two.

The State Department's strategy is admittedly appealing at first glance. The existence of a strong centralized government would allow Afghanistan to function normally in the international arena and better provide for the security and welfare of its citizens. It would also indicate the beneficial effects of international intervention into conflict-ridden areas.

Likewise, there is much to be wary of with the tribal engagement plan. The first is the cost; the plan may lead to higher casualties, since more troops will be in harm's way. Also, the loyalty of tribal militias may be suspect, and they could use defect to the Taliban or advance their own agendas. Finally, U.S. policymakers must guard themselves against inadvertently taking sides in Afghan politics.

That being said, waiting for a central Afghan government to form may be even more problematic. As Eikenberry himself has warned, Afghan President Hamid Karzai may not be an "adequate strategic partner." Similar concerns have been expressed in regard to the flawed elections in August, in which Karzai was been accused of fraud. The recent postponement of parliamentary elections, while wise, further indicates the troubled state of the Afghan government.

The decentralized tribal engagement strategy may not be ideal, but it is probably the most effective option available. As the strategy would make use of Special Forces teams to work with tribal leaders, it may not require the massive amount of troops an Iraq-style surge would call for. Moreover, by enhancing the capability of local actors, it could minimize the risk of creating Afghan institutions dependent on the U.S. presence. Finally, it can both tie in well with efforts to reintegrate low-level Taliban militants and obviate the need to work with Taliban leaders, as tribal engagement would establish an alternative set of actors with whom the United States could work.

Progressives would do well to pay attention to our developing Afghanistan strategy. The tribal engagement approach may be both effective in stabilizing Afghanistan and complementary to broader progressive goals. This strategy could lay the groundwork for the 2011 troop reduction the president has called for, while also satisfying the progressive desire to ensure the Afghan people live in a stable and independent society. It would also echo earlier Democratic calls for an emphasis in the use of Special Forces, demonstrating Democrats' understanding of national security issues. Like everything in international politics, there is no option in Afghanistan that is simultaneously easy, morally sound, and politically viable. This strategy, however, may be the closest thing to such an option.

Obama's Afghanistan troop decision necessary

Guest post by Jared Stancombe

Jared Stancombe, a 2009 graduate of Indiana University, is currently an analyst for a U.S. government agency responsible for national security. He is also in the officer selection process for the U.S. Marine Corps. He lives in Washington, D.C.

Ed. note: This is Jared's third guest post on Afghanistan and the Afghan War. You can find his first two here and here. -- MJWS

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Obama's decision to send approximately 34,000 new troops to Afghanistan is a necessary decision to finally disable al-Qaeda's ability to reorganize along with the Taliban in the southern region of the country. With a timeframe of 18 months, the insurgents may simply wait it out; however, it is my opinion that this timeframe is necessary.

The ultimate goal in Afghanistan is not to make the struggling state become stable, but rather to disable and disrupt al-Qaeda from launching attacks upon U.S. interests. Fixing Afghanistan is an effort that would take generations, and Obama has realized that Afghanistan is only a component on the effort to disrupt terrorism across the globe.

Yemen is increasingly becoming politically unstable and Somalia is a failed state with a substantial al-Qaeda influence. The focus of al-Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan but the Baluchistan region along the border with Pakistan . Also, domestic threats threaten U.S. interests, and some Americans have been recruited by al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

Afghanistan has failed politically. Karzai no longer has the legitimacy he once had, and the institutions that the U.S. has invested millions in do not deliver the basic services to the Afghans they are responsible for. The Karzai regime is beyond corrupt, and a centralized national government is not the fix for local problems. Afghanistan is a countless mess of localized problems that a centralized government cannot solve comprehensively.

With this failure, we must build up the Afghan National Security Forces, allowing the government to take charge of the counterinsurgency effort and pacify its own country. The fact of the matter is that we will not win in Afghanistan , the Afghans will. That is a primary objective for the counterinsurgency: to empower the country to defeat the insurgents on its own.

Meeting us in the middle on Afghanistan

Guest post by Jared Stancombe

Jared Stancombe is a 2009 graduate of Indiana University, where his studies focused on peace and conflict studies in Northern Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. His other academic interests include counterinsurgency and complex military operations. He is currently an analyst for a U.S. government agency responsible for national security and is in the officer selection process for the United States Marine Corps. He lives in Washington, D.C.

Ed. note: I'd like to welcome Jared to The Reaction. This post will be the first in a series on Afghanistan and the Afghan War, all providing astute analysis of the complex situation. -- MJWS

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As the insurgency in Afghanistan continues, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nations are seeking to dramatically increase the number of soldiers and policemen in the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. With embedded ISAF soldiers, these fresh Afghans can learn through combat how best to secure their country for a better future. 

However, the neo-Taliban insurgency has deliberately targeted training centers for the ANA and ANP, as well as centers of government administration. Despite the dramatic rise in recruitment among Afghan National Security Forces, the insurgency continues to use acts of terrorism and coordinated violence to actively challenge the rule of law of the legitimate regime. 

The Neo-Taliban insurgency is essentially waging classic insurgent warfare in an attempt to isolate the population away from government influence. They are succeeding. While many Afghans do not see the Taliban favorably, they are essentially forced to accept their rule. They secure the roads, protect the opium crops, and in some areas even open up hospitals. While the insurgents do not have the resources to create adequate non-military governmental institutions, something is better than nothing, and some Afghans see the Taliban as a better alternative than the corrupt and weak Karzai regime. 

The counterinsurgency must focus on bottom-up changes, focusing on the population, while seeking to create policies and doctrine that will institutionalize the focus on distinguishing between those we can buy off or negotiate with and those we must alienate from the population. More troops and resources are required for this effort; however, the Karzai Administration must meet us in the middle in creating reform that establishes government legitimacy with the population. 

No amount of ISAF resources will substitute for leadership. Karzai must step up and start talking to the various tribes and incorporate them into the democratic process while providing basic services to show results and rewards for their participation. These could come in the form of proving water treatment facilities, building roads and schools, and providing the resources necessary to educate the future of Afghanistan into trades that could help rebuild their shattered country. But the government is unable to manage projects that could alienate the insurgents from the population. 

Just as the Palestinians voted for Hamas, the Afghans are choosing the Taliban because they view the government as corrupt and unable to provide the basic needs and services they require. While ISAF forces are working hard to root out the insurgents, the government is full of corruption, which makes it unable to provide political solutions after stability operations are conducted. They are essentially unable to meet us in the middle, and, if they continue to fail, our efforts may be in vain.

Surviving and thriving

By Carl

Not that I thought there was any danger in the brush, but...

It's increasingly possible that we will look back and see that August 2009 was this election cycle's height of Republicans' optimism over their political fortunes, and the depth of Democrats' despair.

By the time the midterm elections reach a fever pitch next year, President Obama may well have passed health-care reform, his signature domestic initiative, if not with overwhelming public support then at least with the backing of a solid majority of voters. The now common criticism that he hasn't accomplished anything will have been blunted. And while a high joblessness rate may persist, the narrative will have taken hold that the economy has either recovered or is well on its way.

The scenario above represents Democrats' best-case scenario, and no element of it is assured. But the new Washington Post-ABC News poll makes it appear a bit more likely. The survey found "that support for a government-run health-care plan to compete with private insurers has rebounded from its summertime lows and wins clear majority support from the public." While ratings for Obama's handling of health care and the overall reform plans remained roughly the same, the president has regained the support of some Independents. The Fix points out that the poll also contained bad news for Republicans, giving the party low marks for its ability to make good decisions and handing Democrats a 12-point lead on the generic Congressional ballot.

And thus the curious silence of the Obama administration in August makes itself apparent.

He figured to ride out the storm as no one was paying attention, with only the lasting echoes being the outrageous behavior of teabaggers at the "town halls" Congresscritters held.

Once September came along, with its swine flu warnings and seasonal flu warnings and just, well, cold weather forcing people inside to watch the news, Obama and his staff could take to the airwaves to promote the sensible options with respect to healthcare reform.

Let the anger flow, the thinking was. It will peter out and exhaust itself long before anything comes to a vote.

Precisely the right course to take, once it became apparent that Democrats needed time to absorb the astroturfed outcry and realize it wasn't going to translate into votes.

By not doing anything, in other words, Obama won the fight. Sort of. It's not perfect, healthcare reform, but its a start.

Likewise on Afghanistan: Now that Karzai has been forced to admit that the election was, well, not on the level, Obama has been given a bit of political cover for his Hamlet-like stance on troop increases. If you can't be sure of the palyers going forward, you can afford to wait the play out until the conscience of the king is known.

Indeed, Karzai's admission opens the door to a more palatable environment into which Obama may introduce more troops than many would like to see there. One wonders how much pressure ol' Hamid there was under from State.

There are other obstacles on the horizon, like the banksta bonuses that are about to be announced from banks and investment houses that just ten months ago were hat-in-hand at Obama's door, asking for a bailout. That one could turn ugly, but the sense I get is that people understand how important it was to bail the banks out and oh, yeah... they won't be angry at Obama, but I'm not sure I'd go out and buy a new car if I was president of JP Morgan Chase right now. it might get keyed pretty badly in the parking lot of the "Stop n Shop".

In addition, through the entire summer, the Republicans reveled in the label "The Party of No," talking to it like a drunk frat brother to a keg.

And now that's coming back to haunt them, as people want... no, need... answers to the economy, to jobs, to healthcare, and to their future.

They called Reagan the Teflon Don President. We need to come up with a moniker that covers a guy who slips in shit and comes up smelling like a rose.

(Cross-posted to Simply Left Behind.)

Ethnocentrism on Meet the Press

By LindaBeth

Today's Meet the Press featured David Gregory's interview with President Karzai of Afghanistan. The last question posed to Karzai was regarding the legality of marital rape under Afghani law.

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It is important to watch the clip rather than read the transcript, because Gregory's tone was nothing less than ethnocentric. Gregory is questioning the democratic-ness of Afghanistan because of this law's passing. He might as well have called Afghanistan a "so-called" democracy for having passed an anti-human rights law.

Clearly, making marital rape legal is an egregious human rights violation. However, as so many Americans have been shocked! outraged! at this Afghani law as was Gregory, perhaps a history lesson is in order:

Marital rape was legal in the United States in all 50 states until 1976. Marital rape has only been illegal in all 50 states since 1993. And only 17 states make no legal distinction between marital and non-marital rape in terms of legal charges, sentencing and defensibility. And Raquel Kennedy Bergen writes in her paper, "Marital Rape: New Research and Directions":

However, in 30 states, there are still some exemptions given to husbands from rape prosecution. In most of these 30 states, a husband is exempt when he does not have to use force because his wife is most vulnerable (e.g., she is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, etc.) and is legally unable to consent (Bergen, 1996; Russell, 1990; NCMDR, 2005). Because of the marital contract, a wife's consent is assumed.

This begs the question: Who are we to "primitivize" Afghanistan for legalizing a heinous act that in our own country was not fully illegal until 15 years ago?

And if having no legal civil or human rights violations is the measure of whether or not one is a democracy, then for the majority of its history, the United States has not been a democracy, and perhaps still is not one.

(Cross posted to Smart Like Me)

Headline of the Day (International Palin edition)

By Michael J.W. Stickings

This was the headline from the AFP yesterday:

Palin steps onto world stage with diplomatic meetings

Um, how exactly is it stepping onto the world stage to sit down for pre-arranged meetings with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, meetings purposely designed by the McCain campaign to make it seem as if their little neophyte is seriously engaged in world affairs? What could she possibly have had to say about the situations in either country? (Or was she just there to take it all in?) And how were the meetings in any way "diplomatic"?

She won't answer any questions and has essentially been cut off from the media, and vice versa, and she's being trotted out for brief meetings with select world leaders, that is, for photo ops, but we're still supposed to believe she's ready to be vice president, or even president?

Oh, and she "wore gold earrings in the shape of her home state of Alaska." Now that's classy.

Seriously, what the fuck is going on?

The United States is the most powerful country in the world. And someone like Palin, an extremist who has never been even remotely engaged on the major issues and challenges facing the country, is up for the second highest office in the land?

It's my party and I'll lie if I want to

By Capt. Fogg

It's a bit like Take Your Little Girl to School Day. Little Sarah Palin gets to go to the office with daddy and meet important people like the hand-picked president of the country we occupy: ex-oilman Hamid Karzai. Press coverage would be tacky and intimidating to a little girl, so we're not going to have any of that.

Of course the little girl is 44, and soon to be a grandmother, but in terms of stepping into daddy's shoes and running a superpower she might as well be four and daddy knows it. No reporters, no TV other than for a brief establishment shot -- proof of her being competent to deal with world leaders: all the proof we're going to get until it's too late.

Following true to form, Palin is likely to confuse the meeting with an actual trip to Afghanistan, as she did with her trip to Kuwait, "confusing" it with being on the battlefield in Iraq. Who knows what she will make of her planned meetings with Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, Henry Kissinger, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Will they bring flowers?

In a way it's her coming out party, but she won't be coming out and we won't be coming in. We'll just have to accept that she's too fragile and innocent to be exposed; fragile and innocent enough that our right to know just how out of her element and over her head she is sitting at the big desk is trumped. The Party, the Jesocrats, the lobbyists, the Wall Street Wazirs: they all say she's the best and if we don't want to wake up with a bloody horse's head, we'd better fuggetaboudit.

Cynicism aside -- this is the most outrageous attempt at passing off the flower girl as a debutante and without even Professor Higgins' ability to teach her to enquire about the rain in Spain. It's time for the Real Sarah Palin to come out of the closet, put her foot in her mouth, embarrass her masters, take off the costume and go home to that room somewhere. It's time for us to ask how much more we are going to have to take of this charade, this farce, this willing suspension of disbelief before we are allowed to enquire as to just who that masked woman is?