A diplomatic surge in Pakistan

Guest post by Ziad Haider

Ziad Haider is an MPA/JD candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School and Georgetown Law, and a Truman National Security Fellow. He conducted field research on governance in FATA with the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in the summer of 2008 and previously worked as a foreign policy advisor in the U.S. Senate.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent three-day visit to Islamabad and Lahore highlighted the ongoing challenge of conducting diplomacy in Pakistan. For a nation whose partnership is vital to U.S. security, the fact that 64% of Pakistanis view the U.S. as an enemy represents no small problem. As the White House reassesses its "Af-Pak" strategy, it is important to clearly define U.S. interests in Pakistan and to chart a new course in US-Pakistani relations that places a greater emphasis on diplomacy.

The U.S. has two vital interests in Pakistan. The first is to combat extremism. This includes al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the associated domestic terrorist groups that threaten Pakistan's stability. A corollary to this threat is the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

The second is to ensure regional stability for three reasons: to avoid a conflict between Pakistan and India that would force Pakistan to redeploy troops from west to east and detract from the war in Afghanistan; to avoid a conflict between Pakistan and India that may escalate up the nuclear chain; and to improve regional relations so that Pakistan no longer feels the need to retain militant proxies as leverage against its neighbors.

In combating extremism, the U.S. has been relatively successful at securing Pakistani operational support in Afghanistan, including the transit of vital supplies; getting Pakistan to eliminate key al Qaeda leaders; and nudging it to confront internal threats such as those in the Swat Valley.

While domestic dynamics have driven many of these decisions, U.S. diplomacy has played a role. These successes were accomplished through a mix of coercive and soft diplomacy ranging from a "with us or against us" choice at the onset of the invasion of Afghanistan to the lifting of sanctions and generous provision of military assistance.

On regional stability, the US has successfully engaged in short-term crisis management. These include external crises such as the 2001-2002 Indo-Pak military mobilization and the more recent standoff between the civilian government and opposition over the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Breakthroughs were respectively possible due to high-level and intensive interventions by Secretary of State Colin Powell and by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Yet U.S. diplomacy has also failed in significant measure. The U.S. has been unable to alter the Pakistani army's strategic calculus. The army continues to retain the Taliban and other militant groups as a hedging strategy against Pakistan's neighbors and a seemingly inevitable U.S. drawdown.

U.S. diplomacy has also been unable to generate support among Pakistanis who harbor deep grievances: historic US support for military rule, "abandonment" and sanctions in the nineties, the invasion of Afghanistan, drone strikes, and U.S. policies in the Middle East. This tortured and at times distorted public narrative has impeded robust cooperation with Pakistan's fragile democratic government.

Lastly, the U.S. has failed to take a long-term view in addressing regional dynamics. Historic fissures remain, such as the Pak-Afghan border dispute and Indo-Pak grievances, including Kashmir. The military imperative of fighting a war in Afghanistan has eclipsed the diplomatic imperative of tackling the root causes of insecurity in the region.

So how does the U.S. leverage diplomacy to strengthen its relationship with Pakistan based on "mutual interest and mutual respect?" Here are four key elements to consider.

First, U.S. diplomacy must focus on the Pakistani people. The Kerry-Lugar bill that tripled economic aid was an important start; patience and public diplomacy are required to reap the dividends.

Second, the U.S. must also advance the resolution of core regional issues, including supporting the resumption of the Indo-Pak composite dialogue as well as an eventual Af-Pak dialogue on the status of the Durand Line.

Third, the U.S. must manage the visibility/invisibility paradox. This entails balancing a lower profile to avoid appearing overly intrusive with being sufficiently visible to secure the public dividend of development initiatives and to demonstrate sustained engagement. As reflected in the Kerry-Lugar debate, the U.S. must also walk the fine legislative line between accountability for taxpayer money and perceived dictation infringing on Pakistani sovereignty.

Lastly, however, the U.S. must be honest about why Pakistan matters. Stretching back through the Cold War, the U.S. has always seen Pakistan through a security lens. This raises an inescapable question: can the relationship ever be sustainable if it pivots on avoiding negative outcomes instead of achieving positive ones? The way this question is answered or reframed will define the bilateral relationship beyond the current crisis of the hour.

For now, a democratic and prosperous Pakistan at peace with itself and its neighbors is critical for U.S. national security. To this end, as in Afghanistan, the U.S. is essentially fighting a form of counter-insurgency in Pakistan – minus the troops. This further necessitates a surge in U.S. diplomacy toward Pakistan to secure a more willing and able partner.