Pakistani government aid to militants
By Robin J. Walker
Robin J. Walker, a national security and international relations scholar and policymaker with a special interest in South Asia and non-proliferation, is a fellow at the Truman National Security Project.
This is Robin's first post at The Reaction. Check out his blog Smart Influence, which he started just last month. It features some extremely sharp commentary on his national security and foreign policy interests. -- MJWS
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A front page article in Thursday's New York Times explored the support that Pakistan's government, specifically the S wing of the Inter-Service Intelligence, or ISI, is still providing to militant groups, including the Taliban, who are conducting attacks in Afghanistan. This support has continued despite repeated requests and high level visits from American and British officials.
These militant connections are partly to counter fears of Indian encirclement, since India has invested heavily in Afghan reconstruction, and most of the Pakistani military still sees India, not the militants, as their main threat and opponent, and Pakistan has a long history of using militants as proxy fighters against India, particularly in Kashmir. This connection fairly clearly led to the bombing of India's embassy in Kabul last summer.
A few key questions remain:
1) How closely was the ISI involved in last November's Mumbai attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba? Was it just intelligence sharing and protection, as Pakistani officials claim, or was the whole thing a proxy attack planned by Pakistani military, or even civilian, leadership?
2) How deep do the connections between ISI and the militants run? Is it largely the work of a "few bad apples" who maintain their ties, or something much bigger?
3) What can the United States/coalition do to entice Pakistan to renounce support for these groups and leaders? Certainly just sending the Predator drones into Quetta and elsewhere in Baluchistan is possible (and being debated -- watch for news of expanded strikes in the next few weeks), but is it worth the cost?
(Cross-posted from Smart Influence.)
Robin J. Walker, a national security and international relations scholar and policymaker with a special interest in South Asia and non-proliferation, is a fellow at the Truman National Security Project.
This is Robin's first post at The Reaction. Check out his blog Smart Influence, which he started just last month. It features some extremely sharp commentary on his national security and foreign policy interests. -- MJWS
**********
A front page article in Thursday's New York Times explored the support that Pakistan's government, specifically the S wing of the Inter-Service Intelligence, or ISI, is still providing to militant groups, including the Taliban, who are conducting attacks in Afghanistan. This support has continued despite repeated requests and high level visits from American and British officials.
These militant connections are partly to counter fears of Indian encirclement, since India has invested heavily in Afghan reconstruction, and most of the Pakistani military still sees India, not the militants, as their main threat and opponent, and Pakistan has a long history of using militants as proxy fighters against India, particularly in Kashmir. This connection fairly clearly led to the bombing of India's embassy in Kabul last summer.
A few key questions remain:
1) How closely was the ISI involved in last November's Mumbai attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba? Was it just intelligence sharing and protection, as Pakistani officials claim, or was the whole thing a proxy attack planned by Pakistani military, or even civilian, leadership?
2) How deep do the connections between ISI and the militants run? Is it largely the work of a "few bad apples" who maintain their ties, or something much bigger?
3) What can the United States/coalition do to entice Pakistan to renounce support for these groups and leaders? Certainly just sending the Predator drones into Quetta and elsewhere in Baluchistan is possible (and being debated -- watch for news of expanded strikes in the next few weeks), but is it worth the cost?
(Cross-posted from Smart Influence.)
Labels: Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Taliban
posted by Michael J.W. Stickings at
11:15 AM
1 Comments:
People who understand this region of Afghanistan Pakistan know very well how closely linked these two countries are. There is no practice border between to the two countries as same ethnic group lives on both sides of the border and does not recognise the international border. Also for ages, as Afghanistan is a land locked country, all its trade is conducted through Pakistan. Resolving Pakistan will resolve Afghanistan and vice versa so for the purposes of eliminating Al-Qaida, this region should be considered one continuous territory and Afpak is an apt name for it.
http://real-politique.blogspot.com
By Sikander Hayat
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Sikander Hayat, at 4:46 PM
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